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ABSTRACT 
The paper evaluates how South Africa’s public policy towards the death penalty is protected 
amidst increased taxpayer information transparency.  
The People’s Republic of China (China) may, under article 22(4) of the Joint Council of 
Europe/OECD Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (2010) 
(Multilateral Convention), use information received from South Africa, for criminal prosecution 
of a South African taxpayer in a non-tax matter in China, if the South African Revenue Service 
(the SARS) authorises such use. The Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China 86 of 1997 
sanctions the use of the death penalty for various economic crimes and this law has an unlimited 
territorial scope. China may therefore impose the death penalty on a South African taxpayer at the 
hands of information supplied by the SARS.  
This study will establish what public policy-based remedies are available for a South 
African taxpayer in this scenario. The SARS is not obliged to exchange information with China’s 
tax authority, as such an action will be contrary to South Africa’s public policy. Where the South 
African taxpayer concerned is in South Africa, including at a sea- or airport, then the SARS has a 
constitutional obligation not to exchange the information. Further, the South African state has an 
international obligation not to exchange the information where the method of execution in China 
is cruel, inhuman or degrading. 
The paper concludes that before exchanging the information and authorising its use for 
non-tax purposes, the SARS must take reasonable steps to evaluate whether it is foreseeable that 
the exchange of taxpayer information will be against South Africa’s public policy. The SARS is 
under a legal duty not to exchange information with China where the SARS foresees that such an 
action may lead to the imposition of the death penalty on a South African taxpayer in China. A 
further recommendation is that the public policy protection must be reinforced by amending the 
wording of the Multilateral Convention and the bilateral income tax treaty between China and 
South Africa in line with what other countries have done, in order to clarify that South Africa’s 
public policy specifically prevents the imposition of the death penalty. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION   
1.1. BACKGROUND TO THE LEGAL STATUS OF SOUTH AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL 
TAX AGREEMENTS  
South Africa’s domestic legislation, namely the Tax Administration Act (TAA), permits cross 
border exchange of taxpayer information under international tax agreements.1 For purposes of 
this paper, it is important to establish the process under which international tax agreements are 
incorporated into South African legislation and in order to do that, the constitutional status of 
South Africa’s international tax agreements must be examined.  
According to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (ITA), publication of an international tax 
agreement in the Government Gazette will be of the same effect as if it is legislated in the ITA.2 
This section was part of the 1962 Income Tax Act and it must be understood against this 
historical context. Before the Interim Constitution,3 the executive branch of the government 
had oversight over the treaty making process and for an international agreement to become law 
of general application, parliament had to incorporate a treaty through an act.4 S 108 of the ITA 
must always be read in line with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(Constitution). Parliament took over the role of ratifying and acceding to international tax 
agreements after 1994.  
The Constitution enshrines that an international tax agreement becomes law after it has 
been approved by both houses of parliament,5 unless it is an international agreement of a 
‘technical, administrative or executive’ nature or if it does not require ratification or accession, 
then it only needs to be tabled in parliament.6 State practice indicates that the nature of an 
international tax agreement is not ‘technical, administrative or executive’ as it requires 
parliamentary ratification and accession.7  
                                                          
1 Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 s 3(3)(a)(i). 
2 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s 108(2). 
3  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
4 PJ Hattingh ‘Elimination and Avoidance of International Double Taxation’ in De Koker & Brincler (eds) Silke on 
International Tax (2010) s 36.14. 
5 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 231(2).  
6 Ibid s 231(3). 
7 Hattingh op cit note 4. 
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Section 231(4) of the Constitution further states that an international agreement becomes 
law in South Africa when it is enacted into law by national legislation, but a self-executing 
provision only has to be approved by parliament to become law of general application, unless 
it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. There are different views on 
whether South Africa’s double taxation agreements are self-executing. The term ‘self-
executing’ was defined obiter by the court in Goodwin v The Director General, Department of 
Justice and Constitutional Development, as follows: 
“A treaty can be described as self-executing if its provisions are automatically, without any 
formal or specific act of incorporation by state authorities, part of the law of the land and 
enforceable by municipal courts.”8 
One view is that double taxation agreements are not self-executing and must be enacted 
into national legislation, namely s 108(2) of the ITA, in order to become part of domestic law. 
S 108(2) of the ITA states that international tax agreements shall be notified by publication in 
the Government Gazette and it will thereupon have effect as if enacted in the ITA. The 
following precedents support this view. The court in CSARS v Van Kets9 held that an enabling 
Act of Parliament, the ITA, gave the executive the power to incorporate the international tax 
agreement between South Africa and Australia into municipal law, through publication in the 
Government Gazette. In CSARS v Tradehold Ltd10 the court titled s 108 of the ITA ‘enabling 
legislation’ when referring to the international tax agreement between South Africa and 
Luxembourg. It can possibly be argued that the court indirectly confirmed that s 108 serves as 
national legislation that is required to incorporate international tax agreements into domestic 
legislation. In Krok v CSARS11 the court held that the international tax agreement and a later 
protocol between South Africa and Australia were concluded under s 108(2) of the ITA and s 
231(4) of the Constitution. The court stated that the agreement and protocol became South 
African law when they were approved by the legislature and duly gazetted. By implication, the 
                                                          
8 Goodwin v The Director General, Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (T) unreported case 
number 21142/08 of 23 June 2008 para. 37. 
9 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Van Kets 2012 (3) SA 399 (WCC) para 18. 
10 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold 2012 (3) All SA 15 (SCA) para 15. 
11 Krok v The Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services (SCA) unreported case numbers 20230/2014 and 
20232/2014 of 15 August 2015 para 24. 
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court held that international tax agreements are not self-executing as publication in the 
Government Gazette is required in order to become domestic law.12 
Another view, supported by the author, is that double tax agreements are self-executing. It 
is submitted that self-executing provisions are stand-alone provisions that would be 
enforceable in court13 and distributive provisions in double taxation agreements are therefore 
self-executing. South Africa’s international tax agreements are published in the Government 
Gazette after approval by parliament and are not contained in separate legislation passed by 
parliament. The only possible legislation that can be viewed as enacting international tax 
agreements is s 108(2) of the ITA, which requires publication in the Government Gazette 
before an international tax agreement has the effect as if enacted in the ITA. It is however 
submitted that “this provision is of administrative nature aimed to empower tax administration 
to carry out treaty obligations in context of the powers granted under the ITA”.14 S 231(4) of 
the Constitution further requires that self-executing provisions must not be inconsistent with 
the Constitution or Acts of Parliament. Although the very nature of international tax 
agreements are in conflict with the ITA as the ITA places an income tax liability on a taxpayer 
and international tax agreements may provide relief for that liability, they are consistent with 
the ITA as s 108 envisions international tax agreements. International tax agreements are 
therefore self-executing and are consistent with the Constitution and Acts of Parliament and 
they only need to be approved by parliament in order to become law of general application and 
need not be enacted into legislation.  
S 108(2) of the ITA is in conflict with s 231(4) of the Constitution. S108(2) of the ITA 
states that international tax agreements must be published in the Government Gazette before 
having the effect as if enacted in the ITA and s 234(4) of the Constitution states that a self-
executing provision becomes law of general application once approved by Parliament. The 
Constitution is the superior law and all South African law is subject to the Constitution. S 108 
of the ITA must also be read against its historical context, as stated above. The role of s 108 
changed fundamentally under the Interim Constitution and the Constitution took over the role 
                                                          
12 I du Plessis ‘The Incorporation of Double Taxation Agreements into South African Domestic Law’ (2015) 18 No 4 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1194. 
13 Sei Fujii v California 19 ILR 312 (1952), at 314. 
14  Hattingh op cit note 4. 
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of the law making process of international tax agreements. Under s 231(4) of the Constitution, 
tax treaties become law by parliamentary approval alone and separate incorporating legislation 
is not required.15 The date of parliamentary approval, and not publication in the Government 
Gazette, is therefore the date of publication of an international agreement.  
A further question is whether international tax agreements therefore have direct effect once 
approved by parliament.16 South Africa’s double tax treaties require reciprocal notification by 
each contracting state once their due legal process is completed. The date upon which the last 
due legal processes is completed in each state is the date of entry into force of South Africa’s 
tax treaties. Parliament will then approve a tax treaty under s 231(4) of the Constitution, which 
will then be the enforcement date, seeing that the Constitution is the superior law.17  
It is also important to establish the status of an international tax agreement in relation to 
domestic legislation. One view is that a double tax agreement ranks higher than domestic 
legislation, among others the ITA. This view states that the tax treaty has the same force as the 
Constitution and courts will therefore apply double tax treaties in preference to the ITA.18 
South African courts took the following different views. In Glenister v President of the RSA,19 
the Constitutional Court stated that incorporating international agreements only create 
domestic statutory obligations and does not create constitutional rights and obligations. In 
CSARS v Tradehold Ltd,20 the Supreme Court of Appeal stated that an international tax 
agreement modifies domestic law and will be applied over the domestic law to the extent that 
there is no conflict. In CSARS v Van Kets,21 the court agreed with the minority judgement of 
Glenister v President of the RSA and stated that international tax agreements rank equally with 
domestic legislation and the provisions of both should be read as a coherent whole.22 In A M 
Moolla23 the Supreme Court of Appeal found that double tax agreements form part of the 
relevant act and where there is conflict between the legislation, domestic law will take 
preference. The double tax agreement must however be interpreted to avoid any conflict 
                                                          
15 Hattingh op cit note 4. 
16 Hattingh op cit note 4. 
17 Hattingh op cit note 4. 
18 Hattingh op cit note 4.  
19 Glenister v President of the RSA 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) para 181.  
20 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold 2012 (3) All SA 15 (SCA). 
21 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Van Kets 2012 (3) SA 399 (WCC). 
22 I du Plessis ‘Some thoughts on the Interpretation of Tax Treaties in South Africa' (2012) SA Merc LJ 31 at 40. 
23 AM Moolla Group Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service (65) SATC 414. 
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between the legislation. One view is that South African courts will follow CSARS v Tradehold 
Ltd and the author prefers this view and agrees that the Constitution establishes international 
tax agreements superior to the ITA.24  
1.2. SARS’S INFORMATION GATHERING POWERS 
The South African Revenue Service (the SARS) has information gathering powers under the 
TAA. It is important to establish what these powers entail as the powers form the basis of 
everything that the SARS is authorised to do, and it is subject to constitutional circumspection.    
A judge may grant an order for an inquiry where there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that a person failed to comply with a tax act, committed a tax offence or concealed assets.25 
The SARS has the power to authorise any person to conduct an inquiry into a taxpayer’s affairs 
for the purposes of administrating the tax acts.26 The inquiry is private and confidential and a 
residing officer, as designated by the court, leads the inquiry.27 
The SARS may select a person for inspection, verification or audit based on a relevant 
consideration of a tax act, including on a random or a risk assessment basis.28 A SARS official 
may be authorised to conduct a field audit or a criminal investigation and may require a person 
to make available, at the person’s premises, relevant information.29 If it appears that the 
taxpayer may have committed a serious tax offence, the investigation must be referred to a 
senior SARS official responsible for criminal investigations, to decide whether a criminal 
investigation should be pursued.30 During an investigation, SARS must apply its gathering 
powers with due regard for the taxpayer’s constitutional rights as a suspect in a criminal 
investigation.31 The information obtained may be used in subsequent civil and criminal 
proceedings.32 A SARS’s official may inspect a premises used for trading, without prior notice, 
to only determine the identity of the occupant, whether he is registered for tax and is complying 
                                                          
24 I du Plessis Incorporation of Double Taxation Agreements op cit note 12 at 1196. 
25 Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 s 51(1). 
26 Ibid s 50(3). 
27 Ibid s 56(1), 51(2)(a).  
28 Ibid s 40. 
29 Ibid s 41(1), s48(1). 
30 Ibid s 43(1). 
31 Ibid s 44(1). 
32 Ibid s 44(3). 
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with record keeping duties.33 SARS may require a taxpayer, or another person, to submit 
relevant information within a reasonable time and to attend an interview.34  
SARS must apply ex parte to the court for a warrant to enter and search premises where 
relevant information is kept and to seize the information.35 SARS’s search and seizure powers 
are subject to the overarching normative authority of the Constitution, which includes the right 
to privacy.36  
1.3. BACKGROUND TO CROSS-BORDER EXCHANGE OF TAXPAYERS’ INFORMATION 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
South Africa has numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements in place with respect to the 
exchange of taxpayer information. South Africa’s tax authority, namely the SARS, shall 
exchange South African taxpayers’ information with another tax authority in accordance with 
the provisions of bilateral or multilateral agreements. The receiving state may, depending on 
the wording of the applicable agreement, use that information to prosecute tax crimes or other 
economic crimes that a South African taxpayer committed. The criminal law of the receiving 
state could possibly sanction the death penalty for these crimes. South Africa’s Bill of Rights37 
however preserves the right to life to everyone in South Africa and the state must protect, 
promote and fulfil this right to life.38 This right may only be limited in terms of the general 
limitation rule contained in section 36 of the Constitution. Most international tax agreements 
state that South Africa does not have the obligation to supply information that would be 
contrary to public policy. In light of this constitutional right to life and South Africa’s public 
policy towards the death penalty, this study will consider the remedies available to South 
African taxpayers when they can be sentenced to death in another country at the hands of 
taxpayer information supplied by the SARS. It is an emerging area of research and the question 
of protection of South African taxpayers’ fundamental right to life in the exchange of taxpayer 
information process has gone unanswered. The purpose of this research is to ensure that the 
constitutional right to life of a South African taxpayer remains protected amidst increased 
                                                          
33 Ibid s 45(1).  
34 Ibid s 46(1), 47(1). 
35 Ibid s 59(1)-(2). 
36 AP de Koker & RC Williams Silke on South African Income Tax (2018) s 18.113. 
37 Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
38 Supra note 5 at s 11. 
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taxpayer information transparency. The research will support that South Africa should be an 
example for practical protection of human rights to other developing and emerging countries. 
This paper will further make recommendations to the responsible South African fiscal and 
prosecuting authorities to afford adequate remedies to taxpayers.  
1.4. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The main research question is; what public policy-based remedies are currently available to 
South African taxpayers during the exchange of taxpayer information process with a country 
that sanctions the use of the death penalty, namely the People’s Republic of China (China)? 
The study will examine South Africa’s public policy towards the death penalty in light of the 
remedies afforded to a taxpayer when an international tax agreement includes a clause stating 
that a contracting state does not have an obligation to disclose information that would be 
contrary to public policy. 
The focus is on exchange of taxpayer information with China and a sub-question of this 
paper is; what is China’s public policy towards the death penalty and what is the actual 
imposition of the death penalty for economic crimes in China? An additional sub-question is 
who may be prosecuted in China under the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China 
86 of 1997 (China’s Criminal Law) and whether such persons can claim protection under the 
Constitution. This paper analyses possible scenarios of exchange of South African taxpayers’ 
information with China. A further sub-question is whether the Agreement between the 
Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income [China - South Africa Income Tax Treaty (2000)]39 and the Joint Council of 
Europe/OECD Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (2010) 
(Multilateral Convention) have conflicting treaty norms? This paper finally questions, as a 
second question in the alternative, whether there are existing treaty provisions that afford more 
protection to a taxpayer than the China - South Africa Income Tax Treaty (2000) or the 
Multilateral Convention.  
                                                          
39 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the People’s Republic 
of China for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income (25 
April 2000), Treaties IBFD [hereinafter China – South Africa Income Tax Treaty]. 
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1.5. LIMITATIONS OF SCOPE 
The analysis is limited to the protection of South African taxpayers’ fundamental right to life 
and the focus is on exchange of taxpayer information on request, automatic exchange of 
taxpayer information and spontaneous exchange of taxpayer information with China. China’s 
death penalty law status is retentionist, meaning that China retains the death penalty for 
ordinary crimes. It is reported that China is the world’s leading executioner as China executes 
and sentences thousands of people to death each year, but the exact figure remains classified 
as a state secret.40 China further imposes the death penalty for various economic crimes. China 
is South Africa’s main trading partner, as for many other African countries as well.  
The definition of a ‘South African taxpayer’ will be confined to the following three 
scenarios; a South African citizen and tax resident who is a taxpayer in China, a South African 
taxpayer who is a citizen and taxpayer in China and a tax resident of a third country, and lastly 
a Chinese citizen and tax resident who is a taxpayer in South Africa. 
1.6. RESEARCH METHOD 
A doctrinal, desktop-based research method is used. The main documentary data analysed to 
answer the research question is primary legislation, specifically the Constitution, China’s 
Criminal Law, the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 2004 (China’s 
Constitution), the Multilateral Convention, the China – South Africa Income Tax Treaty (2000) 
and South African and foreign case law. Secondary sources are also analysed, including 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) publications, OECD 
Models and commentaries, and publications by various researchers.  
1.7. STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER 
Chapter 2 analyses South Africa’s public policy towards the death penalty in light of the fact 
that South Africa does not have an obligation to supply information that is contrary to public 
policy. This chapter examines international instruments, domestic legislation and common law 
principles that afford remedies to the taxpayer and includes a discussion on these legislative 
frameworks’ territorial scope.       
                                                          
40 Liu Renwen ‘Recent Reforms and Prospects in China’ in Hood and Deva (eds) Confronting Capital Punishment in 
Asia (2013) 107-22. 
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Chapter 3 analyses China’s public policy towards the death penalty. This chapter examines 
the legislation sanctioning the death penalty for economic crimes in China, including a 
discussion on the territorial scope of China’s Criminal Law. This chapter further looks at the 
actual imposition of the death penalty for economic crimes in China. 
The applicable treaty provisions are discussed in chapter 4. A comparison is made between 
article 26(1) of the China – South Africa Income Tax Treaty (2000) and article 22(4) of the 
Multilateral Convention, pertaining to the use of information for other purposes, in order to 
conclude whether these are conflicting treaty norms. A short comparison is made between the 
protection given to a taxpayer under exchange of taxpayer information on request, automatic 
exchange of taxpayer information and spontaneous exchange of taxpayer information. This 
chapter will further consider South Africa’s actual performance in exchanging information 
with treaty partners. 
Chapter 5 provides detailed application of the theory discussed in the preceding content 
chapters to possible scenarios.        
The final chapter revisits the research question in light of the content chapters. This chapter 
provides recommendations on how to reinforce the remedies available to South African 
taxpayers. 
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CHAPTER 2: PUBLIC POLICY-BASED REMEDIES IN THE EXCHANGE OF TAXPAYER 
INFORMATION PROCESS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
South Africa is not obliged, in terms of its bilateral tax treaty with China or the Multilateral 
Convention, to exchange information that is contrary to public policy. This chapter will 
establish South Africa’s public policy on the death penalty in order to conclude whether South 
Africa may refuse to exchange information with China, when imposition of the death penalty 
on a taxpayer in China is foreseeable. The analyses will include an evaluation of the wording 
of the public policy limitation clause in the applicable tax agreements, South Africa’s 
constitutional right to life and its territorial scope, South Africa’s international instruments 
concerning the death penalty and the common law revenue rule.  
2.2 PUBLIC POLICY-BASED REMEDIES IN THE EXCHANGE OF TAXPAYER 
INFORMATION PROCESS 
Article 26(2)(c) of the China – South Africa Income Tax Treaty (2000) and article 21(2)(d) of 
the Multilateral Convention, include limitations on providing taxpayers’ information to a 
contracting state when the disclosure would be contrary to public policy (ordre public). The 
wording of this public policy limitation in the China – South Africa Income Tax Treaty (2000) 
and the Multilateral Convention are identical to the wording of article 26(3)(c) of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital [OECD Model (2017)].41 The Multilateral 
Convention entered into force in South Africa on 1 March 2014 and in China on 1 February 
2016, subject to certain notifications, declarations and reservations of both countries. This 
limitation on the exchange of taxpayer information concerns the vital interest of a state. Even 
though the wording of the treaty clause does not require exceptional circumstances for this 
public policy limitation to apply, various authors see the limitation narrowly and state that it 
will only apply in extreme cases. OECD commentary state that public policy issues are seldom 
in information exchanges between treaty partners.42 Ana Paula Dourado also states that the 
public policy justification argument must be ‘interpreted restrictively as a safeguard clause for 
                                                          
41 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (21 November 2017), Models IBFD. 
42 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Commentary on Article 26 para. 19.5 (21 November 
2017), Models IBFD. 
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extreme and exceptional cases’. Dourado explains that the request for information is against 
the requested state’s public policy if it is against its fundamental constitutional rights. Dourado 
states that the requested state must therefore do a fundamental evaluation of the purpose for 
which the information is requested or how the information is going to be handled by the 
requesting state and whether it is compatible with its fundamental rights (rule of law).43 The 
public policy justification can be invoked when the purpose and procedures result in ‘an 
intolerable discrepancy with the rule of law of the requested state’.44 Examples, given by the 
OECD commentary, of where this public policy limitation will apply is where an investigation 
in the requesting state was driven by racial, religious or political persecution.45 Other instances 
is where state secret information, namely sensitive data, is held by secret services and the 
exposure thereof will be opposing the vital interest of the requested state.46 Similarly, when 
exchange of taxpayer information is inconsistent with domestic law or it leads to discrimination 
contrary to human rights, expropriation or political prosecution.47 Where the assessment is 
made under the requested state’s domestic laws, other arguments under article 26(3) of the 
OECD Model (2017) can occur and the public policy argument could apply in exceptional 
circumstances here as well. Where any international fundamental rights are violated, the 
requested state can invoke the public policy justification if it is subscribed to an international 
convention, for example the European Convention on Human Rights or it is a member state of 
an organization, for example the European Union.48 The author reads this public policy 
limitation wider than only being applicable to exceptional circumstances and considers it 
applicable when it violates any part of a requested state’s public policy. However, what a 
contracting state considers to be public policy is an open question and a contracting state that 
is reluctant to exchange certain information can therefore fall back on this public policy-based 
remedy to not exchange information. It will be difficult for the requesting state to challenge a 
                                                          
43 Ana Paula Dourado ‘Article 26. Exchange of Information’ in Ekkehart Reimer & Alexander Rust (eds) Klaus Vogel 
on Double Taxation Conventions 4ed (2015) 1924. 
44 Engelschalk V&L 5ed (2008) 108-109. 
45 OECD Commentary op cit note 42. 
46 OECD ‘Text of the Revised Explanatory Report to the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax 
Matters as Amended by Protocol’ available at https://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-
information/Explanatory_Report_ENG_%2015_04_2010.pdf, accessed on 7 October 2018. 
47 Harald Schaumburg Internationales Steuerrecht  2 ed. (2011) note 19.8 p 1333. 
48 Dourado op cit note 43. 
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refusal based on public policy.49 This limitation on the obligation to exchange information is 
worded as a discretionary restriction and therefore a requested state has the freedom to refuse 
to exchange information where, in their opinion, it is contrary to public policy and the security 
of the state. This limitation gives the requested state discretionary freedom to protect taxpayers, 
but it does not contain an obligation to fulfil this duty.50 Even though the treaty as such imposes 
no duty, domestic law, constitutional law and international obligations may impose a duty, as 
is explained in this chapter. 
2.3 SOUTH AFRICA’S PUBLIC POLICY TOWARDS THE DEATH PENALTY  
A situation can arise where there is a real risk that the information that the SARS will supply 
to China may lead to the imposition of the death penalty on a South African taxpayer in China. 
In order to establish whether the SARS is under a legal duty to invoke the public policy-based 
remedy, as outlined in section 2.2, under such a situation, South Africa’s public policy towards 
the death penalty must be considered.  
South Africa had a mandatory death penalty regime from 1917. South Africa then followed 
the ‘doctrine of extenuating circumstances’ under the Criminal Procedure and Evidence 
(Amendment) Act of 1935 in terms of which a judge was required to find a mitigating factor 
in order to find that the death penalty is not called for. This doctrine was in conflict with the 
international movement of the time that death penalties must be limited to the most serious 
crimes by establishing a presumption against death.51 The Apartheid government of the time 
used the death penalty to reinforce its oppressive policies and imposed it on political activists. 
Under the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act of 1990, South Africa replaced this doctrine 
with a discretionary death penalty regime and finally, in 1995, abolished the death penalty. 
South Africa is currently an abolitionist country, meaning that South Africa does not impose 
the death penalty for any crimes. 
                                                          
49 Sara K McCracken “Going, going, gone…Global: A Canadian Perspective on International Tax Administration 
Issues in the ‘Exchange of Information Age’” (2002) Vol. 50 no 6 Canadian Tax Journal 1869 at 1883.  
50 Roman Seer & Isabel Gabert (eds) ‘Mutual Assistance and Information Exchange’ (2010) EATLP Santiago de 
Compostela 2009 Congress 107. 
51 Andrew Novak ‘Capital sentencing discretion’ in Southern Africa: A human rights perspective on the doctrine of 
extenuating circumstances in death penalty cases’ (2014) 14 African Human Rights LJ 26. 
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2.3.a Right to life  
Section 11 of the Constitution states that everyone has the right to life. The rights to 
life and dignity have generally been classified as the key sources for all other personal 
rights of the Bill of Rights. The right to life differs from similar rights in foreign 
constitutions and international law as it does not have an internal limiter.52 The right to 
life includes a negative duty not to kill and a positive duty to protect life in unique 
circumstances. The right to life is unqualified and may only be limited through the 
limitation clause in section 36 of the Constitution. Taking a life will not be 
unconstitutional if it is, in terms of law of general application, reasonable and justifiable 
in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.  The 
requirements of the limitation clause was however not met in S v Makwanyane to justify 
the limitation imposed on the right to life by the death penalty as a sentence for murder, 
as is explained below. 
Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 and section 6 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights entrench every person’s right to 
life. A court can consider international law principles, but it is not bound to follow it.53 
2.3.a.i South African precedents on the death penalty 
South Africa had very active death penalty sentencing during Apartheid. The 
African National Congress set a moratorium on death sentences as a 
prerequisite for negotiations in 1990. President De Klerk subsequently stated in 
his speech on 2 February 1990 that the question of the death penalty would be 
revisited. The last execution in South Africa took place in November 1989, but 
the Criminal Law Amendment Act 107 of 1990 retained the death penalty, 
however, it did away with mandatory death penalty, and restricted the 
application to the most serious crimes. Instead of outlawing the death penalty 
in the Constitution, the government left the question for the Constitutional 
Court.54 Shortly after the certification of the Interim Constitution,55 in S v 
                                                          
52 D Davis & P Youens ‘Life’ in MH Cheadle (ed) South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2017) s 6.1. 
53 S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) para 39. 
54 Dirk van Zyl Smith ‘The Death Penalty in Africa’ (2004) 4 African Human Rights LJ 1 at 10. 
55 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
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Makwanyane,56 the Constitutional Court unanimously declared the death 
penalty as unconstitutional. The court stated that the rights to life and dignity 
are the most important human rights and retribution cannot be given the same 
weight under the Constitution. The prosecutor failed to prove that the death 
penalty is more effective to discourage or prevent murder than life 
imprisonment is. In light of these factors, and the arbitrariness and the chance 
of making a mistake in enforcing the death penalty, the death penalty was no 
longer justifiable as a punishment for murder. Accordingly, the requirements of 
the limitation clause, section 33(1) under the Interim Constitution, were not 
met.57 Section 277(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 set the death 
penalty for murder and the court held that this section was inconsistent with 
section 11(2) of the Interim Constitution as it provided for inhuman, cruel and 
degrading punishment. In the main judgment of the court, Chaskalson P 
anchored the abolitionist argument in the fundamental values of human dignity 
and the right to life, making it a very strong precedent used worldwide.58 Langa 
J relied more directly on the right to life and emphasized the concept of ubuntu, 
namely communal humanity.59 Mahomed J also relied on the right to life and 
stated that even though this right may not be unqualified, when it is breached 
arbitrarily in a cruel manner, it cannot be justified.60 Following this decision, 
the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 formally abolished the death 
penalty. The wording of the right to life was however not amended in the final 
Constitution and therefore, the death penalty will remain unconstitutional in 
South Africa until the Constitution is amended.  
The prohibition of the death penalty in South Africa was confirmed in 
Mohamed and another v President of the Republic of South Africa and others.61 
This case concerned the handing over of a suspected terrorist to the authorities 
of the United States of America (‘US’) without having the assurance that he 
                                                          
56 Makwanyane supra note 53. 
57 Makwanyane supra note 53 para 146. 
58 Makwanyane supra note 53 para 144. 
59 Makwanyane supra note 53 paras 219 and 225. 
60 Davis et al op cit note 52 s 6.4. 
61 Mohamed and another v President of the Republic of South Africa and others (2001) JOL 8498 (CC). 
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will not receive the death penalty as punishment. The South African 
Constitutional Court found that the South African immigration authorities did 
not give value to his right of human dignity, life and his right not to be subjected 
to inhuman, degrading or cruel punishment.62 The state has a positive duty to 
protect his life. The court found that, because of the finding in S v Makwanyane, 
his removal under circumstances where he might face the death penalty was 
contrary to the Constitution’s underlying values. The court also stated that the 
international community shares the court’s view on the death penalty. This rule, 
however, only applies when the authorities know that the deported suspect 
could be sentenced to death in the other country.63 Minister of Home Affairs and 
Others v Tsebe and Others64 confirmed that it is impermissible to deport or 
extradite a person to a retentionist state and consequently expose him to a real 
risk of execution. After Sibiya and Others v Director of Public Prosecutions 
and Others,65 all the death penalties sentenced before 1995 were replaced with 
appropriate sentencing.  
2.3.b The relationship between national law and international law 
In order to establish further what South Africa’s public policy towards the death penalty 
is, South Africa’s international instruments on the death penalty must be analysed. 
However, before analysing the international instruments, it is important to establish 
what the relationship between national law and international law is. A state may not 
invoke its national law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty, which means 
that a conversation between national and international law is required.66 From the 
perspective of a South African court, the Constitution is the supreme law. South African 
judges must strive to reconcile national law with international standards, but in the 
event of conflict, the national law prevails.67  
                                                          
62 Mohamed supra note 61 para 59. 
63 Jeebhai v Minister of Home Affairs 2007 (10) BCLR 1146 (T) para 37. 
64 Minister of Home Affairs and Others v Tsebe and Others 2012 (5) SA 467 (CC) para 43. 
65 Sibiya and Others v Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2005 (5) SA 315 (CC). 
66 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, art. 27. 
67 Andreas O'Shea International Law and the Bill of Rights (2004) s 7A1. 
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Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution states that, when the Bill of Rights is 
interpreted, international law must be considered. It is therefore a mandatory 
requirement to consider international law, but it does not necessarily have to be applied 
where there are other overriding considerations arising out of rules of interpretation or 
out of the Constitution itself. Section 233 of the Constitution states that a court must 
favour any reasonable interpretation of legislation that is consistent with international 
law. This rule must also apply to interpretation of the Constitution, as the Constitution 
was promulgated in the form of a statute.68 Section 39(1)(a) of the Constitution also 
states that the Bill of Rights must be interpreted to “promote the values that underlie an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.” 
The scope of the term ‘international law’ includes the general principles of law 
recognised by international custom, civilised nations, international conventions and 
teachings and judicial decisions, as supplementary means for determining the rules of 
law.69 South Africa has ratified very few human rights treaties. The court should 
therefore refer to both binding and non-binding international law, namely the complete 
international framework of international human rights standards, when interpreting the 
Bill of Rights.70 Regional treaties concluded outside Africa should also be used as 
guidance, but the necessary precaution should be applied where regional or national 
circumstances have their own considerations distinct to another region.71  
Treaties constitute the clearest form of consent to human rights norms by countries. 
Where South Africa has signed a treaty, but has not yet ratified the treaty, South Africa 
has an international obligation to refrain from acts that would defeat the treaty’s object 
and purpose.72 The period between signature and ratification is there for reviewing all 
domestic law and policy, to ensure that it will comply with the treaty at ratification.73 
Treaties in force are binding on its parties and must be performed in good faith.74 A 
                                                          
68 Ibid s 7A2. 
69 Statute of the International Court of Justice (1946) s 38.  
70 Halton Cheadle ‘Interpretation of the Bill of Rights’ in MH Cheadle (ed) South African Constitutional Law: The 
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reasonable interpretation of the Bill of Rights, consistent with the obligation of good 
faith is preferred.75  
Section 232 of the Constitution states that customary international law is law in 
South Africa, except if it is inconsistent with an Act of Parliament or the Constitution. 
Customary law is formed by general practice and is accepted as law. Customary law 
will play an important role in South African courts if South Africa does not ratify major 
international human rights treaties and incorporate it into domestic law. The use of 
customary law in South African courts has however been very rare.76  
International and national judicial decisions and writings are subsidiary sources to 
determine the rules of law, but in practice, it is the most useful source for the South 
African Constitutional Court and other forums.77 
2.3.b.i South Africa’s international instruments on the death penalty 
South Africa’s international instruments concerning the death penalty must be 
examined as part of South Africa’ public policy towards the death penalty. The 
right to life ranks highest amongst all other human rights and the death penalty 
is a big threat to this right. A number of treaties deal with the death penalty. The 
objective of most of these treaties is to eventually abolish the death penalty 
globally, but the basic human rights and humanitarian documents regulate 
rather than abolish the death penalty. South Africa has the following 
international instruments regarding the death penalty in place: 
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International 
Instrument 
Ratification / 
Accession (a) 
/ Adherence 
(b) 
 
Comment 
International Covenant 
on Civil and Political 
Rights, 16 December 
1966 
10 December 
1998 
This covenant allows the imposition of the death 
penalty for the ‘most serious crimes’ by those 
countries that has not abolished it, but the covenant 
further provides that ‘nothing in this article shall be 
invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of capital 
punishment by any state party to the present 
covenant’.78 
Second Optional 
Protocol to the 
International Covenant 
on Civil and Political 
Rights Aiming at the 
Abolition of the Death 
Penalty, 15 December 
1989 
28 August 
2002 (a) 
This protocol requires that state parties introduce 
necessary measures to abolish the use of the death 
penalty within their jurisdiction.79 
African Charter on 
Human and People’s 
Rights, 27 June 1981 
9 July 1996 
(b) 
Chapter four of the charter states that no person may 
be arbitrarily deprived of the right to life. It is however 
questionable whether the charter inspires abolition of 
the death penalty, as it does not mention the death 
penalty or the need to abolish it. A protocol to the 
charter will therefore have to clarify this question. The 
African Commission on Human and People’s Rights 
adopted a draft Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights on the Abolition of the 
                                                          
78 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 Desember 1996, United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 999, article 6(2)-(6).  
79 O'Shea op cit note 67 s 7A49. 
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Death Penalty in Africa. The African Union’s 
Specialised Technical Committee on Justice and Legal 
Affairs did not consider the first draft in November 
2015, referring to lack of legal basis to do so. In the 
event that the protocol to the charter is adopted, Africa 
will be the third regional human rights system, after 
the Americas and Europe, to adopt such a protocol. 
(Europe has adopted Protocol No 6 to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of 
the Death Penalty of 1989 and the Americas has 
adopted the Protocol to the American Convention on 
Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty.) 
African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of 
the Child, 11 July 1990 
7 January 
2000 
The charter abolishes the death penalty for children. 
Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights on the 
Rights of Women in 
Africa, 11 July 2003 
17 December 
2004 
Article 4(2)(j) entrenches that states may not execute 
the death sentence on nursing or pregnant women.  
 
 The international community’s objective that the death penalty must be 
abolished worldwide is also reflected in that the International Criminal Court 
has a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.80 The right to life in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights has reached the status of customary 
international law. The exact content of the right to life may not find expression 
in a consistent practice, but a common respect for this right by states out of a 
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sense of legal obligation cannot be denied.81 Customary law does not forbid the 
use of the death penalty, as state practices are inconsistent, but there is an 
emerging rule requiring its abolition.82 International law does not prohibit the 
death penalty, as there is no international instrument that absolutely outlaws it. 
The formulation of the universal human rights provisions, statements and 
resolutions by the United Nations (‘UN’) and human rights bodies and some 
regional human rights systems strongly suggest that the abolition of the death 
penalty is desirable.83 It will therefore depend on domestic law whether the 
death penalty is outlawed or not.  
2.3.c The Revenue Rule 
The revenue rule is an established South African common law rule, which states that 
South African courts will not, indirectly or directly, enforce the revenue laws of a 
foreign state. In Krok v Commissioner for SARS84 the Supreme Court of Appeal’s view 
on the rationale for the revenue rule was that the revenue rule does not fundamentally 
aim to provide taxpayers with protection, but rather justified the revenue rule on the 
‘embarrassment approach’. In terms of this approach, the enforcement of a foreign tax 
claim must be preceded by an investigation of the underlying policies of the foreign 
revenue law in question, which can result in disruption of interstate relations if a 
negative view is formed about the foreign law because, for example, it offends local 
public policy.85 It is unclear whether the court’s ‘embarrassment approach’ justification 
for the revenue rule is regarded as South African law, a better view might be that the 
revenue rule aims to secure non-intrusion by the judiciary in the executive’s 
international relations’ prerogative.86 This case found that when contracting states 
conclude a tax treaty that provides for mutual assistance in tax matters, the reason for 
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83 The Working Group on the Death Penalty in Africa ‘Study on the Question of the Death Penalty in Africa’ at 44, 
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the revenue rule falls away.87 The court’s assumptions are that, under a tax treaty clause 
concerning mutual assistance in collection of taxes, the contracting states agree to 
protect each other’s fiscal interest as a recognition of sovereignty. Further, that the 
states were willing to consent, in all circumstances, to the tax claims based on the 
underlying foreign domestic tax laws.   
The decision suggests that where two contracting states conclude a tax treaty that 
allows for exchange of taxpayer information, considerations for the revenue rule’s 
justifications fall away and are no longer applicable when interpreting the tax treaty. 
However, where a contracting state imposes a tax covered by the treaty that breaches a 
fundamental right in the requested state, can the request be denied based on the revenue 
rule? In South Africa, considering its constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rights, 
considerations for public policy cannot be repealed in absolute terms in a tax treaty.88 
It is therefore argued that where a South African exchange of information clause does 
not contain the public policy limitations (which is currently not the case with the 
treaties concluded with China), public policy must still be considered under the revenue 
rule. 
2.4 SCOPE OF THE CONSTITUTION   
Section 11 of the Constitution states that everyone has the right to life. The term ‘everyone’ 
means every person within the jurisdiction of the courts, irrespective of their status. All natural 
persons hold this right and it therefore applies to residents, citizens, visitors and illegal 
immigrants.89 Public policy may dictate that this right to life cannot be waived. Rights based 
on fundamental values of the Constitution may be inalienable.90 A further question, which will 
be discussed in the case law below, is whether the Constitution has extra-territorial effect. 
In Mohamed and another v President of the Republic of South Africa and others, a potential 
difficulty with the application of the constitutional values to extradition by the South African 
government arose, namely the territorial scope of the Constitution. This case concerned the 
                                                          
87 Krok supra note 84 para 29. 
88 Hattingh Krok op cit note 86 at 50. 
89 Halton Cheadle ‘Rights Bearers’ in MH Cheadle (ed) South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2017) 
s 3.6. 
90 Ibid s 3.7. 
26 
 
 
 
handing over of a suspected terrorist to the US authorities to stand trial in the US, without the 
South African government obtaining a guarantee that he will not face the death penalty. The 
death or inhuman or degrading treatment would have occurred outside South Africa’s territory 
at the hands of another government. This case involved an illegal immigrant of South Africa, 
namely a Tanzanian national. Mohamed was hiding in South Africa, because he was wanted 
by the US for the bombing of their embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The question 
before the court was whether the South African government fulfilled its constitutional duty to 
obtain assurance that Mohamed will not receive a death sentence.91 The South African 
Constitutional Court’s decision related to a moot issue as Mohamed was already deported to 
the US and was standing trial in the Federal Court for the Southern District of New York.92 
The Constitution does not apply to events occurring outside of South Africa’s territory. Even 
though the Bill of Rights makes no express limitation on its territorial application, it only binds 
organs of the South African state and no other governments.93 The South African government 
has the obligation to protect the rights of everyone in South Africa.94 Any extra-territorial 
application of South African law must be consistent with international jurisdiction principles. 
The extraditing state does not have control over the criminal justice system of the requesting 
state. The court did not address the territorial application directly, but it can be inferred from 
the court’s reasons that the government’s actions within South Africa’s territory constituted a 
violation of the Bill of Rights, namely that the person’s life and human dignity was 
threatened.95 The rights in the Bill of Rights were extended to Mohamed as his physical 
presence in the country triggered constitutional protection.96 The South African Constitutional 
Court found that the South African government officials acted unlawfully by not demanding a 
guarantee from the US that the death sentence will not be imposed on Mohamed or, if imposed, 
would not be executed, before handing Mohamed over for trial in the US. The government 
officials’ action was unlawful in that it infringed Mohamed’s constitutional right to life, human 
dignity and to not be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading manner. The 
                                                          
91 Max du Plessis ‘The Extra-Territorial Application of the South African Constitution (2003) 120 SALJ 797. 
92 Ibid at 805. 
93 O'Shea op cit note 67 s 7A20. 
94 Mohamed supra note 61 para 59. 
95 O'Shea op cit note 67 s 7A20. 
96 Max du Plessis Extra-Territorial Application op cit note 91 SALJ 813. 
27 
 
 
 
Constitutional Court ordered further that its judgement must be urgently drawn to the attention 
of the Federal Court for the Southern District of New York.  
In Kaunda v the Republic of South Africa,97 Kaunda and 68 other South African citizens 
voluntarily left for Zimbabwe, where they were arrested and faced the potential risk of being 
extradited to Equatorial Guinea for an attempted coup, where they could face the death 
sentence. The applicants requested that the South African government take the necessary 
diplomatic action to ensure that their rights under the Constitution were respected by 
Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea. The case raised important questions about the nature and 
the extent of the right of diplomatic protection of South African citizens abroad.98 The majority 
judgment concluded that diplomatic protection is not recognised by international law as a 
human right and cannot be enforced as such and the applicants could therefore not base their 
claims on customary international law.99 In the majority judgment in the Constitutional Court, 
Chaskalson CJ then turned to the question of whether the South African Constitution places a 
burden on the South African government under the present circumstances. The Constitutional 
Court stated that right bearers under the Bill of Rights are people in South Africa. The 
international law principle that the sovereignty of another state may not be obstructed, limits 
an application of national law in another state. The court stated that the Bill of Rights binds the 
government, even when it acts outside of South Africa, provided that it does not constitute an 
infringement on the sovereignty of another state.100 The majority held that there is no 
enforceable right to diplomatic protection, but South African citizens are however entitled to 
request protection from South Africa, under international law, against wrongful acts of foreign 
states.101 Chaskalson CJ stated that the applicants had no right to claim that South Africa’s 
government must take action to avert the laws of the foreign state in which they were being 
held, being applied to them, even though capital punishment is inconsistent with South Africa’s 
Constitution. This was subject to the qualification that the laws of the foreign state were 
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consistent with international human rights norms and at the time of the case, the death penalty 
was not per se a violation of international human rights law.102 Chaskalson CJ stated that: 
“Counsel for the amicus curiae submitted that it is cruel treatment to put a person on trial 
in a foreign country to face a possible death sentence if convicted. However, as long as the 
proceedings and prescribed punishments are consistent with international law, South 
Africans who commit offences in foreign countries are liable to be dealt with in accordance 
with the laws of those countries, and not the requirements of our Constitution, and are 
subject to the penalties prescribed by such laws.”103 
The author submits that there is presently no universally binding international law that 
forbids the death penalty. The court would unfortunately likely have come to the same decision 
if it was decided today, namely that the court would not have directed the South African 
government to seek assurance from Equatorial Guinea that the death penalty would not be 
imposed on the applicants. 
The court distinguished its earlier judgement in Mohamed and another v President of the 
Republic of South Africa and others in that even though Mohamed was in the US at the time 
of the trial, his rights were infringed in South Africa by government officials and not in the US 
where Mohamed found himself as a result of this violation of his rights. This differs to the facts 
in Kaunda v the Republic of South Africa as the applicants voluntarily left South Africa to go 
to Zimbabwe and their arrest in Zimbabwe and the possibility of their extradition to Equatorial 
Guinea are not the result of unlawful conduct of the South African government.104 The South 
African government’s only action in Kaunda’s case was that it exchanged information about 
potential criminal conduct with Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea and because of this 
information, they were arrested upon arrival in Zimbabwe. The court held that the exchange of 
information did not infringe Kaunda’s rights, but rather said that the failure to supply the 
information of a suspected coup to the other countries might be a breach of South Africa’s 
international law obligations.105 The court held that South Africa had an obligation to co-
operate with Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea in the prevention and combating of crime, 
including the duty to share information of suspected coup attempts or mercenary activity. 
Chaskalson CJ stated that at best for the applicants, the South African authorities failed to warn 
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them of the information that the authorities received or that they would send it to Zimbabwe 
and Equatorial Guinea, but this was not a breach of duty by the South African government.106 
One of the reasons that the Constitutional Court, in Kaunda v the Republic of South Africa 
and Thatcher v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development,107 did not order the South 
African government to intervene diplomatically, was that the applicants were not yet sentenced 
and they would intervene only after the death penalty is imposed by the foreign court.108 Du 
Plessis and Peté comment that this is not a satisfactory policy as it underestimates the secrecy 
and speed with which certain foreign states can impose the death penalty. This policy also 
places unrealistic faith in the commitment by foreign states to protect comity and good 
relations with others.109 This policy also does not reflect the international jurisprudence that 
the imposition of the death penalty after an unfair trial is in itself a violation of the accused’s 
right not to be subject to cruel, degrading or unhuman treatment, even if the sentence is 
eventually commuted.110  
In Soering v the United Kingdom,111 the US requested the extradition of a person from the 
United Kingdom because of a murder charge. Soering would have been sentenced to death in 
the US and the European Court of Human Rights found that his extradition contravenes section 
3 of the European Convention on Human rights, which prohibits degrading, inhuman or cruel 
treatment. The death row circumstances was cruel as Soering would spend six to eight years 
on death row, because of his youth and that there was psychiatric evidence that he suffered 
from an abnormality of mind at the time of the act of murder. The US was not a party to the 
European Convention on Human rights. The United Kingdom argued that they were not 
responsible for inhuman or degrading treatment that the person may suffer outside their 
jurisdiction. The court however held that where extradition holds consequences affecting the 
enjoyment of a convention right, it might involve a breach of the extraditing state’s 
international obligations, providing that the consequences are not too remote. The United 
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Kingdom was held responsible for foreseeable consequences outside its jurisdiction in this 
case.112  
In Ng v Canada,113 the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations held that Canada 
was in breach of article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which 
prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Canada extradited Ng to the 
US and Canada could foresee that Ng would be sentenced to death under circumstances that is 
not in line with article 7, namely that he would be executed by asphyxiation in a gas chamber. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights permits the imposition of the death 
penalty ‘for the most serious crimes’, but the method of execution in the US was found to be 
cruel punishment under article 7 of the covenant. Canada therefore breached their international 
obligation under the covenant. In a similar case, namely Kindler v Canada,114 Kindler was 
extradited to the US from Canada and it was foreseen that he could face the death penalty in 
the US. The method of execution in the US in this case was not asphyxiation in a gas chamber, 
as in Ng v Canada, but rather execution by lethal injection. Kindler argued that Canada had 
breached their obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights when 
Canada authorised the extradition without gaining an assurance from the US that they will not 
impose the death penalty on Kindler. The United Nations Human Rights Committee held that 
the method of execution, namely lethal injection, was not a cruel execution method and Canada 
therefore did not breach its obligation under section 7 of the covenant.  
In Lawyers for Human Rights v Minister of Home Affairs, the Constitutional Court held 
that people, who are held at a port of entry in South Africa pending a decision on whether they 
may formally enter the country, are not beyond the jurisdiction of South African courts for the 
enforcement of the Bill of Rights. This was stated even though section 7(1) of the Constitution 
enshrines the rights of people ‘in our country’. The court held that the rights to detained persons 
and their personal freedom and security, in sections 35(2) and 12 of the Constitution, are 
integral to the fundamental constitutional values of human dignity, freedom and equality. The 
court further held that the denial of these rights to people, who are physically in South Africa 
at air- or seaports, only because they have not entered the country formally, would constitute 
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a denial of the values underlying the Constitution. The court stated that it could not be 
suggested that a person who commits murder on a ship in South African waters is not liable to 
stand trial in South African courts or that people who are unlawfully held on a ship in South 
African waters cannot turn to South African courts for protection.115 Further, travellers on an 
international flight that will land in South Africa are subject to the South African courts’ 
jurisdiction.116 Similarly, in Abdi and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others117 the 
court held that people who are held in an inadmissible facility in a port of entry into South 
Africa, were not beyond South African court’s jurisdiction. In this case, no guarantee could be 
given that the appellants, who were refugees, would not be persecuted or tortured, or face 
inhuman, degrading and cruel treatment if they were sent back to Somalia. It will be against 
South Africa’s fundamental constitutional values when a person is deported to a state and it 
would result in the implementation of cruel, degrading or unusual punishment.118  
When South Africa’s officials assist foreign governments in the criminal prosecution of 
South African nationals abroad, without taking the necessary steps to ensure that the accused 
are ineligible for the death penalty, it may be regarded as, if not active, then passive 
participation in carrying out the imposition and enforcement of the death penalty.119 There 
must be a sufficient close nexus between the action of the authorities in South Africa and the 
results of these actions in a foreign state, to hold the authorities liable for ‘extra-territorial’ 
breaches of the Constitution.120 This casual approach is evident from Mohamed and another v 
President of the Republic of South Africa and others. The court found that, with regard to the 
right to life, the South African authorities bore a casual nexus with the risk of Mohamed 
receiving a death sentence: 
“The fact that Mohamed is now facing the possibility of a death sentence is the direct result 
of the failure by the South African authorities to secure such an undertaking [against the 
death penalty]121. The causal connection is clear between the handing over of Mohamed to 
the FBI for removal to the United States for trial without securing an assurance against the 
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imposition of the death sentence and the threat of such a sentence now being imposed on 
Mohamed.”122   
The nexus is whether there are substantial reasons to believe that the official’s action will 
lead to prohibited consequences. If there are such grounds, then the public authority’s act may 
be unlawful as it is incompatible with the Bill of Rights. In this situation, the Constitution is 
being applied to prohibit acts of officials, subject to its jurisdiction, that causes harm to the 
individual wherever the result of the harm is occasioned. The nexus between the authorities’ 
act of removal and the eventual harm caused is established by the person’s physical presence 
in South Africa prior to removal. The person’s physical presence triggers constitutional 
protection. Further, the nexus is to be assessed based on ‘foreseeability’. There must be a 
sufficient real risk of danger for the person. The authorities have a positive obligation to take 
reasonable steps to safeguard the person from foreseeable violation of the person’s rights.123  
In conclusion, the right bearers of the right to life in the Constitution are therefore every 
person in South Africa’s jurisdiction. A taxpayer must therefore be inside South Africa’s 
jurisdiction in order to carry the protection of the right to life. Based on Mohamed and another 
v President of the Republic of South Africa and others, it is argued that if the South African 
tax authority exchanges information of a South African taxpayer, who was physically present 
in South Africa, and it is foreseeable that it will lead to this taxpayer being sentenced to death 
in the requesting state, it constitutes a violation of the Bill of Rights, namely an action of the 
SARS that threatens a person’s life and human dignity. The SARS must therefore obtain a 
guarantee from China that a taxpayer will not face the death penalty in China before sending 
the information to China or not send the information at all.   
Based on Kaunda v Republic of South Africa, a scenario can exist where SARS supplies 
information to China about a South African taxpayer, who is physically present in China, and 
at the hands of this information, the taxpayer is arrested and could possibly face the death 
sentence in China via lethal injection. Without taking the public policy-based remedy in tax 
treaties into account, SARS will be obliged to co-operate with China in the prevention and 
combating of crime and would therefore be obliged to exchange the taxpayer’s information 
with China in this circumstances. The South African government would further not be obliged, 
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under the South African Constitution or international law, to seek assurance that the death 
penalty would not be imposed on the South African taxpayer.    
The International Covenant on Social and Political Rights tolerates the death penalty ‘for 
the most serious crimes’, but the method of execution must not be cruel, inhuman or degrading. 
Based on Ng v Canada and Kindler v Canada, the information exchange by the tax authorities 
will not breach South Africa’s international obligation under the International Covenant on 
Social and Political Rights where it is foreseeable that the information exchange can lead to 
the sentencing of the death penalty in the requesting state. A requisite to the aforementioned is 
that the execution must be in accordance with the requirements of the covenant. Therefore, 
where the method of execution in China is cruel, inhuman or degrading, then South Africa will 
breach its international obligation. The author submits that South Africa will not always know 
whether the method of execution will be cruel in China and South Africa therefore has an 
international obligation not to exchange information where it foresees the imposition of the 
death penalty on the taxpayer, as there is a risk that the execution method will be cruel.   
Further, where Chinese citizens take refuge at our sea- or airports and they face the death 
penalty in China for some transgression, they are within the jurisdiction of South African courts 
and are right bearers of South African constitutional rights.  
2.5 CONCLUSION 
It is clear from South Africa’s constitutional right to life and its international instruments on 
the death penalty, that the country’s public policy does not support the death penalty. Under 
the China – South Africa Income Tax Treaty (2000) and the Multilateral Convention, the South 
African state is, in certain circumstances, under a constitutional and international law 
obligation not to exchange information where it is foreseeable that it may lead to imposition 
of the death penalty on a South African taxpayer in China. Where this is foreseeable, then the 
South African state has the following obligations in these different circumstances: 
 Where the South African taxpayer is in South Africa, then the South African state has 
a constitutional obligation not to exchange the information. 
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 Where the South African taxpayer is a Chinese citizen that takes refuge at a South 
African sea- or airport, then the South African state has a constitutional obligation not 
to exchange the information. 
 Where the South African taxpayer is outside of South Africa, whether the person is 
ordinarily resident in South Africa or not, then the South African state has no 
constitutional obligation not to exchange the information. 
 However, in all of the aforementioned circumstances, the South African state has an 
international obligation not to exchange the information where the method of execution 
in China is cruel, inhuman or degrading.  
Further, in all circumstances, the SARS has a discretion to use the public-policy based remedy 
in the tax treaties with China and refuse to exchange the information as the death penalty is 
contrary to South Africa’s public policy. Otherwise, the South African state can demand, prior 
to any exchange of taxpayer information, that the Chinese government must give an assurance 
that death is not an optional sentence in the prosecution of a South African taxpayer. 
  
35 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY FOR ECONOMIC CRIMES IN 
CHINA 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter considers the history and current imposition of the death penalty in China. The 
focus is specifically on economic crimes that are punishable by death. Chinese international 
law and domestic law are set out in this chapter. The territorial jurisdiction of China’s Criminal 
Law is analysed to establish who may be prosecuted in China. Finally, the actual imposition 
of the death penalty on economic crimes in China is analysed by way of known cases. 
3.2 THE HISTORY OF CHINA’S PUBLIC POLICY TOWARDS THE DEATH PENALTY 
China is an active retentionist country, meaning that the death penalty remains lawful in China 
and China still conducts executions. The precise number of annual executions in China is a 
national secret, but available information indicates that China carries out thousands of 
executions each year. China has for a number of years accounted for up to 95 per cent of all 
recorded worldwide judicial executions.124 Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese Communist Leader, 
said on 17 January 1986 that:  
“The death penalty cannot be eliminated. Why are we not giving the death penalty for 
public officials who have committed severe economic crimes in which tens of millions of 
renminbi (RMB) are lost through corruption? We have to execute more felons to show our 
determination against crime.”125  
There is however cautious optimism about the death penalty in China as China made the 
announcement in March 2007, at the UN Human Rights Council, that it was anticipated that 
the death penalty’s scope would be reduced with the final goal of abolishment.126 China 
however did not set a timeline to achieve this goal.  
In 1997, the death penalty for ordinary theft was abolished in China.127 In 2004, China’s 
Constitution was amended to read that China protects and has respect for human rights. The 
term ‘human rights’ is not defined in China’s Constitution, but it pertains to the fundamental 
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rights of citizens and can be classified into seven types.128 The right to life is the basis of the 
right to freedom of the person as prescribed by China’s Constitution, but a person may be 
sentenced to death.129 On 1 January 2007, the highest judicial court in China, namely the 
Supreme People’s Court, decided to take over the power to approve and review death penalty 
cases from the provincial high courts. They did this in order to ‘kill fewer, kill cautiously’.130 
This resulted therein that the number of executions reduced significantly, as it limited the 
implementation of the death penalty by the lower courts.131 Thereafter, the Chinese 
government was more willing to discuss the death penalty with European countries. On 25 
February 2011, 13 non-violent economic crimes were removed from China’s Criminal Law as 
death-eligible offences, as well as the exclusion of elderly above 75 years of age. China 
confirmed that crimes concerning bribery and corruption were never on the proposed list of 
crimes that would have been abolished in the draft eight amendment in 2011, as rumours 
suggested, but that authorities will continue to punish these offenders harshly. The ninth 
amendment to China’s Criminal Law came into force on 1 November 2015 and it transformed 
the death penalty system and further abolished the death penalty for nine crimes.132 
Even though this is a move in the right direction towards abolition, China still uses the 
death penalty as an instrument of political governance and as a preventative measure to stop 
anti-socialistic corruption influences. China has a wide variety of offences, namely 46 
offences, which are punishable by death. According to article 48(1) of China’s Criminal Law, 
the death penalty only applies to extremely serious crimes and if the immediate implementation 
of the death penalty is not necessary, a two-year postponement of execution may be awarded. 
China has however not restricted the death-eligible offences to only a small number of serious 
crimes and the list still includes economic crimes.133 24 out of the 46 death-eligible offences 
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are non-violent crimes.134 Cases of innocent people receiving the death penalty have also 
become known.135 
3.3 THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN CHINA 
3.3.a International Treaty Law (whether in force or not) 
China signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1998, but has 
not ratified the covenant. Article 6 of this covenant states that the death penalty may 
only be imposed for the most serious crimes and nothing in that article shall be invoked 
to postpone or stop the abolition of the death penalty. The Safeguards Guaranteeing 
Protection of the Rights of those Facing the Death Penalty136 are the international 
minimum standards for countries that still impose the death penalty, regardless of 
whether China is subject to any treaty norms. These safeguards state that death-legible 
crimes should be limited to ‘intentional crimes with lethal or other extremely grave 
circumstances’.137 The Human Rights Resolution 30/5 of the United Nations Human 
Rights Council limited the scope of the crimes punishable by death to not be 
implemented for non-violent acts as religious practice or expression of conscience, 
sexual relations between consenting adults and financial crimes, nor as a compulsory 
sentence.138 There is therefore pressure on China to include provisions in its criminal 
law that will improve pre-trial and trial procedures and limit the scope of the death 
penalty.139  
3.3.b Domestic Chinese legislation sanctioning the death penalty for economic crimes in 
China 
Article 383(3) of China’s Criminal Law states that: 
“…if he embezzles in especially huge amount, which causes especially serious loss 
to the interests of the State and the people, he shall be sentenced to life 
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imprisonment or death penalty and concurrently sentenced to confiscation of 
property.”140 
Article 386 of China’s Criminal Law states that: 
“Whoever has committed the crime of acceptance of bribes shall, on the basis of 
the amount of money or property accepted and the seriousness of the circumstances, 
be punished in accordance with the provisions of Article 383 of this Law. Whoever 
extorts bribes from another person shall be given a heavier punishment.”141 
People who are given two-year suspended death sentences qualify to have the 
sentence be commuted to life imprisonment, but no further commutation is possible. 
Article 385 of China’s Criminal Law states that the death sentence for bribery is also 
applicable to state functionaries.  
The term ‘especially huge’ is not defined in the ninth amendment to China’s 
Criminal Law. In April 2016, the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate together issued a clarification stating that offenders found guilty of 
embezzling or accepting bribes for three million yuan142 or more is an extremely serious 
case and will be sentenced to death. They further explained that mitigating factors, such 
as cooperation during the investigation, might suspend the death sentence.143 
Further, under crimes of endangering national security, article 125 of China’s 
Criminal Law states that: 
“Whoever illegally manufactures, trades in, transports, mails or stores any guns, 
ammunition or explosives shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less 
than three years but not more than 10 years; if the circumstances are serious, he 
shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 10 years, life 
imprisonment or death. 
Whoever illegally manufactures, trades in, transports or stores poisonous or 
radioactive substances, infectious disease pathogens or other substances, thereby 
endangering public security, shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of 
the preceding paragraph.”144 
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Under crimes of dereliction of duty, Article 439 of China’s Criminal Law states 
that: 
“Whoever illegally sells or transfers weapons or equipment of the armed forces 
shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not 
more than 10 years; if a large amount of weapons or equipment is sold or transferred 
or if there are other especially serious circumstances involved, he shall be sentenced 
to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 10 years, life imprisonment or death.”145 
To summarise, the following types of economic crimes may lead to the death 
penalty in China: 
 Embezzlement of more than three million yuan that causes serious loss to 
the state and the people of China. 
 Acceptance and extortion of bribes of more than three million yuan. 
 Illegally manufacturing, trading in, transporting, mailing or storing any 
guns, ammunition or explosives under serious circumstances. 
 Illegally manufacturing, trading in, transporting or storing any poisonous or 
radioactive substances, infectious disease pythons or other substances.  
 Selling or transferring weapons or equipment of the armed forces where it 
is a large amount or there are especially serious circumstances.  
3.3.b.i Territorial jurisdiction of China’s Criminal Law 
The territorial scope of China’s Criminal Law is entrenched in these provisions: 
“Article 6   This Law shall be applicable to anyone who commits a crime 
within the territory and territorial waters and space of the People's Republic 
of China, except as otherwise specifically provided by law. 
This Law shall also be applicable to anyone who commits a crime on board 
a ship or aircraft of the People's Republic of China. 
If a criminal act or its consequence takes place within the territory or 
territorial waters or space of the People's Republic of China, the crime shall 
be deemed to have been committed within the territory and territorial waters 
and space of the People's Republic of China. 
Article 7   This Law shall be applicable to any citizen of the People's 
Republic of China who commits a crime prescribed in this Law outside the 
territory and territorial waters and space of the People's Republic of China; 
however, if the maximum punishment to be imposed is fixed-term 
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imprisonment of not more than three years as stipulated in this Law, he may 
be exempted from the investigation for his criminal responsibility. 
This Law shall be applicable to any State functionary or serviceman who 
commits a crime prescribed in this Law outside the territory and territorial 
waters and space of the People's Republic of China. 
Article 8   This Law may be applicable to any foreigner who commits a 
crime outside the territory and territorial waters and space of the People's 
Republic of China against the State of the People's Republic of China or 
against any of its citizens, if for that crime this Law prescribes a minimum 
punishment of fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years; 
however, this does not apply to a crime that is not punishable according to 
the laws of the place where it is committed. 
Article 10   Any person who commits a crime outside the territory and 
territorial waters and space of the People's Republic of China, for which 
according to this Law he should bear criminal responsibility, may still be 
investigated for his criminal responsibility according to this Law, even if he 
has already been tried in a foreign country. However, if he has already 
received criminal punishment in the foreign country, he may be exempted 
from punishment or given a mitigated punishment.”146 
The territorial scope of China’s criminal law is therefore unlimited. It 
applies to everyone within China’s territory, including on board a ship or 
aircraft of China, as well as to Chinese citizens and foreigners outside of China. 
The only possible constraining element is in article 8 of China’s criminal law, 
which states that when a foreigner commits a crime outside of China, it must be 
against the state or China’s citizens. Article 8 further limits the scope by stating 
that China’s criminal law must prescribe a minimum punishment of 
imprisonment of more than three years and the crime must be punishable 
according to the laws of the place where it is committed. To conclude, China’s 
criminal law prescribes the death penalty for various economic crimes and the 
law’s territorial scope is unlimited. The following paragraph examines whether 
China actually imposes the death penalty for these economic crimes or whether 
it is only a theoretical matter. 
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3.4 ACTUAL IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY FOR ECONOMIC CRIMES IN 
CHINA 
China is struggling with serious corruption cases, especially by government officials.147 White 
collar and financial crimes are a big problem. China’s legal system centres on statutory law 
and administrative power, with the judiciary at the outside edge.148 The following cases serve 
as examples of where people were sentenced to death for economic crimes in China as reported 
by media, as information about most death sentences remain unavailable to the public. The 
Chinese government however prefers to lower the profile of death penalty cases and the media 
does therefore not necessarily systematically cover death penalty cases.149  
3.4.a Case Law 
3.4.a.i Cases involving immediate execution of Chinese state officials 
Cheng Kejie, the Chairman of the Guangxi Autonomous Regional Government, 
was executed in 2000 for taking 41.09 million yuan in bribes.150 Hu Changqin, 
the deputy governor of the province of Jiangxi, was executed in 2000 for 
corruption. Wang Huaizhong, a vice-governor of Anui, was executed in 2003 
for corruption.151 In 2007, Zheng Xiaoyu, the former director of the National 
Food and Drug Agency, was executed for accepting 6.49 million RMB worth 
of bribes. He accepted the bribes from pharmaceutical corporations and in 
return, he approved their unsafe or worthless products. In 2009, Li Peiying, the 
former chairperson of the Beijing Capital International Airport, was sentenced 
to death and immediately executed for accepting over 100 million RMB in 
bribes.152 In July 2011, two former mayors, namely Xu Maiyong and Jiang 
Renjie, were executed for accepting bribes of tens of millions of US dollars and 
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further embezzlement and abuse of their powers.153 In July 2013, Zeng Chengji 
was executed for illegally raising an amount of 3.4 billion yuan and defrauding 
investors.154 Xiao Hongbo, a bank official, was also executed for corruption.155  
3.4.a.ii Cases involving suspended death penalty sentences of state officials 
In 2003, Li Jiating, secured benefits for others by taking advantage of his 
position by accepting extremely huge bribes and was sentenced to death. His 
sentence was suspended for two years as he exposed the criminal activities of 
others, confessed to his crimes and the illegal money was retrieved.156 Chen 
Tonghai, CEO of Sinopec, was convicted of accepting over 200 million RMB 
worth of bribes. On 15 July 2009, the Beijing Second Intermediate People’s 
Court sentenced him to death, suspended for two years. Mitigating factors in 
his case were that he surrendered himself, returned all the money and exposed 
important information regarding other criminals.157 Two former directors of 
Construction and Housing within the People’s Liberation Army Logistics 
Department, namely Gu Junshan and Wang Shouye, were convicted of 
accepting bribes. In respectively 2006 and 2015 both men were sentenced to 
death for embezzlement, suspended for two years.158 In 2012, Zheng 
Niansheng, a development zone official, was convicted of accepting bribes and 
sentenced to death, as well as being deprived of his political rights for life and 
confiscation of his personal property. His death sentence was suspended for two 
years as he confessed to some of the facts and most of the bribery income was 
seized.159 In July 2013, Liu Zhijun, the former minister of railways, was 
sentenced to death with a delay of two years for abuse of power and corruption, 
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including the acceptance of bribes of over 10 million US dollars.160 Suspended 
death sentences are usually commuted to life sentence and therefore public 
officials receiving this sentence are not expected to face execution. Zhijun’s 
case is an example of the trend where China creates contradictions when it gives 
mercy for only corrupt state officials or politically connected individuals and 
not those without political power who would probably have been executed 
immediately.161 
3.4.a.iii Cases involving Chinese citizens 
Hu Xiaohong was sentenced to death in 2001 for the illegal trading of explosive 
substances and Wang Yushun and Hao Fengqin were sentenced to death for 
illegally producing and trading explosive substances.162 In 2009, Yang 
Yanming, the former senior trader at a Chinese securities company, was 
executed for embezzlement and misappropriating 94.5 million yuan.163 In 2012, 
Song Wendai, former CEO of a state-owned silver and gold refinery, was 
executed for embezzling 87 million yuan.164  
3.4.a.iv The Siemens cases 
In the Siemens cases, bribes were made to foreign government officials to 
obtain business worldwide, including in China. In these cases, Shi Wanzhong 
and Zhang Chunjiang, former senior executives of Chinese mobile public 
enterprises, were sentenced to a postponed death penalty in 2011 for taking 
bribes. Even though this case concerned Chinese citizens and was decided in a 
Chinese court, foreign investors, especially multinationals, must note how this 
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case originated.165 Information on the Chinese staff involved in the Siemens 
cases were sent to China via diplomatic channels.166 The US Securities and 
Exchange Commission and the Department of Justice investigated Siemens 
AG, a multinational company, for violations of the US Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, involving actions in, amongst others, China. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission reached a settlement with Siemens AG for the 
company’s contravention of the act. It was a multi-jurisdictional enforcement 
action as the US and German authorities worked together to investigate the 
actions of Siemens in various countries under the mutual legal assistance 
provisions of the 1997 Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions.167 The investigation uncovered corrupt 
activities involving Chinese companies and citizens and the information was 
sent to Chinese authorities. This information exchange between governments 
led to the prosecution of the aforementioned Chinese individuals.168 These trials 
were not open to the public as it was deemed to involve state secrets. China has 
however not asserted jurisdiction over Siemens, its subsidiaries or the non-
Chinese citizens involved in the cases.169 
3.4.b Guiding Cases 
The Supreme People’s Court of China introduced the Guiding Cases System in 2010 
that provides a beneficial addition to statutory law. According to this system, guiding 
cases are selected by the Supreme People’s Court of China in order to give guidance 
and reference to judicial personnel at all levels when adjudicating similar cases. Only 
a small number of cases are however selected, there are currently 92 guiding cases, and 
implementation thereof comes with many problems.170 Guiding cases are prepared with 
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an emphasis on abstracting guiding principles however there are substantial regional 
differences in China, therefore the guiding cases are not timely and practical enough to 
meet the needs of local courts.171 
Guiding case number 3 relates to article 385(1) of China’s criminal law. This case 
concerns state officials, Pan Yumei and Chen Ying, who exploited the advantages of 
their offices to seek benefits for others and accepted others’ property of particularly 
enormous amounts, respectively RMB 11.902 million and RMB 5.59 million. The 
mitigating factors in the case were that both defendants confessed their crimes, they 
returned part of the illegal money before the hearing and cooperated in recovering the 
outstanding money after the crime was exposed. On 30 November 2009, the Higher 
People’s Court of Jiangsu Province upheld the Intermediate People’s Court of Nanjing 
Municipality’s sentences of them being found guilty of accepting bribes. Pan Yumei 
received the death penalty with a two-year suspension of execution, was confiscated of 
all property rights and deprived of all political rights for life. Chen Ning received life 
imprisonment, was confiscated of all property rights and deprived of all political rights 
for life.172  
3.5 ECONOMIC CRIMES COMMITTED BY FOREIGNERS 
China has had an increase in crimes committed by foreign companies and individuals since its 
opening up and internationalisation process. The increase in the number of crimes committed 
by foreign individuals and companies in China has become a big problem and the punishment 
and prevention thereof is an urgent issue for China.173 There are massive crimes committed by 
foreign companies in China, for instance commercial bribery, smuggling, and fraud.174 Section 
4 of China’s Criminal Law states that: 
“Article 30 Any company, enterprise, institution, State organ, or organization that 
commits an act that endangers society, which is prescribed by law as a crime committed by 
a unit, shall bear criminal responsibility. 
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Article 31 Where a unit commits a crime, it shall be fined, and the persons who are 
directly in charge and the other persons who are directly responsible for the crime shall be 
given criminal punishment. Where it is otherwise provided for in the Specific Provisions 
of this Law or in other laws, those provisions shall prevail.”175 
China therefore has a ‘double penalty’ as the unit and the person who is held personally 
liable will be punished.176 China’s judicial department however deals with crimes committed 
by foreign companies in an overly courteous manner, despite intolerance of corruption.177 
Prosecuted foreign individuals in China usually come from East Asian countries and Africa.178 
On 25 November 2008, the Guangzhou People’s Intermediate Court announced eight drug 
cases involving foreign defendants who committed drug related crimes and that eight offenders 
were sentenced to death, suspended for two-years, and one to life imprisonment.179 Since 2014, 
2,566 fugitives of corruption crimes, including 410 former officials and 39 on the 100 most-
wanted list, have also been deported to China by 72 countries. Most of these offenders took 
refuge in Canada, Australia and the US and a few in Africa.180 The authors did not state whether 
the fugitives were both Chinese citizens and/or Chinese foreigners. 
The procedural conduct of trials involving foreigners raises problems. In some cases, 
witnesses are not available for cross-examination, important evidence is produced at the last 
minute, suspects are detained for periods longer than prescribed by law, there are no open trials 
and consular representation is not allowed.181 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
Even though China is moving in the direction of abolition of the death penalty, it still imposes 
the death penalty for economic crimes on a significant scale. Corruption, by Chinese citizens 
and foreigners, is a serious problem in China and it is important for China to eradicate it. The 
territorial scope of China’s Criminal Law is unlimited. It is applicable to anyone who commits 
a crime in China, to a citizen who commits a crime outside of China’s territory and to a 
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foreigner who commits a crime outside of China, against the state of China or its citizens, 
except for deminis exemptions. Available cases confirm that China imposes the death penalty 
for embezzlement and bribery and it is therefore not only a theoretical matter but also a serious 
reality. 
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CHAPTER 4: LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR THE EXCHANGE OF TAXPAYER 
INFORMATION  
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Tax crimes often have an international facet, for example, where the proceeds from illicit 
transactions are kept out of the country or where a foreign jurisdiction is used to hide income 
or assets.182  In order to fight tax crimes, it is important for countries to have a comprehensive 
and working international co-operation network.  This may include exchange of information 
assistance between governments and internal exchange of information with all relevant 
national law enforcement and intelligent agencies, where appropriate.183 Information sharing 
between government agencies can reveal new approaches to ongoing investigations, for 
example, where an investigation into a tax crime reveals money laundering or other criminal 
activity.184 This chapter examines the possible ways in which China may use information 
received from South Africa, under a tax exchange of information mechanism, for criminal 
prosecution in non-tax matters.   
Two of the exchange of taxpayer information mechanisms in place between South Africa 
and China are the China - South Africa Income Tax Treaty (2000) and the Multilateral 
Convention. Both these treaties are analysed in this chapter, as well as the question as to which 
agreement governs when conflicting treaty norms arise between the treaties. This chapter will 
further consider South Africa’s actual performance in exchanging taxpayer information with 
treaty partners.  
4.2 LEGAL STATUS OF OECD MATERIALS 
Before interpreting the tax treaties between South Africa and China, it is necessary to study 
the applicability of the OECD model and commentaries, to non-OECD member countries. 
States negotiate treaties on various different model agreements of which the OECD model is 
the most prominent.185 Official commentary accompanies and interprets the OECD model. 
South Africa and China is not OECD member countries, but they were awarded observer status 
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in the Committee on Fiscal Affairs in 2004.186 South Africa and China have generally adopted 
the OECD model as the basis for its tax treaties and has only made minor adjustments to it. 
The OECD commentary has persuasive force when interpreting non-OECD member treaties, 
which are based on the OECD model and where the contracting parties took no specific 
position.187 The commentary is not legally binding on China or South Africa, but it is a highly 
influential tool for interpreting treaties.188 South African courts have not explicitly pronounced 
the status of the OECD commentary, as they refer to the commentary without providing 
reasons for doing so.189 The following chapter will establish that article 26 of the China – South 
Africa Income Tax Treaty (2000) largely follow the OECD Model (2000) and it can therefore 
be assumed that South Africa and China accept the OECD commentary as an interpretation 
aid.  
 A further question is what version of the OECD commentary must be used as it is updated 
regularly. Scholars follow the following two approaches, but there is not a consensus as to 
which approach must prevail. The ambulatory approach is that the law at the time when the 
treaty is applied must be followed and not the law at the time when the treaty was entered 
into.190 The static approach is that the treaty should be interpreted based on the intentions of 
the parties at the time the treaty was entered into. The OECD’s view is that existing treaties 
should be interpreted in the spirit of the revised commentary, but where the revision in the 
model or the commentary differ in substance from those used in previously concluded treaties, 
the revised commentary is irrelevant.191 The updates to the commentaries has persuasive effect, 
but caution must be exercised when applying it to treaties that pre-date the specific set of 
commentary.192 The following paragraphs will interpret the China – South Africa Income Tax 
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Treaty (2000) in the spirit of the revised OECD commentary, but not where it differs in 
substance from the OECD Model (2000).  
4.3 EXCHANGE OF TAXPAYER INFORMATION INSTRUMENTS IN PLACE BETWEEN 
CHINA AND SOUTH AFRICA 
4.3.a Article 26(1) of the China-South Africa Income Tax Treaty (2000) 
Article 26(1) of the China – South Africa Income Tax Treaty (2000) states that: 
“The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such 
information as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of this Agreement or of 
the domestic laws of the Contracting States concerning taxes covered by the 
Agreement insofar as the taxation thereunder is not contrary to the Agreement. The 
exchange of information is not restricted by Article 1. Any information received by 
a Contracting State shall be treated as secret in the same manner as information 
obtained under the domestic laws of that State and shall be disclosed only to persons 
or authorities (including courts and administrative bodies) concerned with the 
assessment or collection of, the enforcement or prosecution in respect of, or the 
determination of appeals in relation to, the taxes covered by the Agreement. Such 
persons or authorities shall use the information only for such purposes. They may 
disclose the information in public court proceedings or in judicial decisions.”193  
Articles 26(1) of the OECD Model (2000) states that: 
“The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such 
information as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of this Convention or of 
the domestic laws concerning taxes of every kind and description imposed on 
behalf of the Contracting States, or of their political subdivisions or local 
authorities, insofar as the taxation thereunder is not contrary to the Convention. The 
exchange of information is not restricted by Articles 1 and 2. Any information 
received by a Contracting State shall be treated as secret in the same manner as 
information obtained under the domestic laws of that State and shall be disclosed 
only to persons or authorities (including courts and administrative bodies) 
concerned with the assessment or collection of, the enforcement or prosecution in 
respect of, or the determination of appeals in relation to the taxes referred to in the 
first sentence. Such persons or authorities shall use the information only for such 
purposes. They may disclose the information in public court proceedings or in 
judicial decisions.” 194 
The following paragraphs explain the meaning of article 26(1) of the China – South 
Africa Income Tax Treaty (2000). This article provides for exchange of taxpayer 
information that is ‘necessary’ for carrying out the provisions of the treaty or the 
                                                          
193 Art.26(1) China - South Africa Income Tax Treaty.  
194 OECD Income and Capital Model Convention art. 26(1) (29 April 2000), Models IBFD. 
51 
 
 
 
domestic laws of the contracting states concerning taxes covered by the treaty. The 
SARS states that they interpret the word ‘necessary’ as equivalent to the words 
‘foreseeably relevant’ as used in the OECD Model (2017).195 States must therefore 
meet a certain threshold of specificity when making an information request in order to 
prevent fishing expeditions.196 The requested information is not restricted to 
information concerning residents of the contracting states and it therefore provides for 
exchange of information in respect of all persons.197 Exchange of information is 
restricted to taxes covered by the treaty.  
The commentary to the OECD Model (2017) and the Multilateral Convention 
indicate that exchange of information in criminal tax matters may also be based on 
multilateral or bilateral treaties on mutual legal assistance in place between countries, 
insofar as the treaties also apply to tax crimes. The Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal 
Matters Treaty between the Republic of South Africa and the People’s Republic of 
China, 2004 (China – South Africa Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Treaty 
(2004)) as well as the Extradition Treaty between the Republic of South Africa and the 
People’s Republic of China, 2004 are both in force. A restriction is set in the exchange 
of information provision in order to keep it within the context of the treaty, namely the 
wording that information should only be given insofar as the taxation under the 
domestic taxation laws concerned is not contrary to the treaty.198  
The requesting state must protect the information exchanged as secret in the same 
manner as information received under the requesting state’s domestic law.199 The 
exchanged information may only be disclosed to authorities or persons, including 
administrative bodies and courts, involved in the collection or assessment of taxes, the 
enforcement of the obligation to pay tax or prosecution or appeals regarding the 
payment of tax. The information may only be disclosed to these persons, regardless of 
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whether there are national disclosure laws that permit better access to governmental 
documents.200 The information received may also not be exchanged with a third state, 
unless the treaty contains an express provision otherwise, which is not the case here.201 
The Commentary on the OECD Models (2000 & 2017) state that information may also 
be disclosed to taxpayers, their proxies or to witnesses.202 Information may not be 
disclosed to authorities that supervise the general administration of a government of a 
contracting state, but who are not involved in tax matters specifically.203 The authorised 
parties may use the information solely for tax purposes, namely the assessment of and 
collection of taxes, the enforcement and prosecution under the tax law and 
determination of appeals. Exchange of information may therefore be requested for both 
criminal and civil tax matters.  
The third sentence of article 26(2) of the OECD Model (2017) further allows  
information received to be used ‘for other purposes’, but the China – South Africa 
Income Tax Treaty (2000), like the OECD Model (2000) on which it is based, does not 
authorise non-tax use of exchanged information.204 The receiving state must resort to 
means specifically designed for those purposes when the information appears to be of 
value to the receiving state for non-tax purposes (e.g. in case of a non-fiscal crime, to 
a judicial assistance treaty).205 Under the bilateral tax treaty, China can therefore not 
share information received from South Africa with the department of public 
prosecution in ‘high priority matters’ such as a corruption case. China must resort to 
other mechanisms specifically intended for those purposes.206 
The information received may further be shared in public court proceedings or in 
judicial decisions, meaning cases dealt with by tax courts or in administrative or penal 
proceedings for tax offences.207 Once the information is used in public court 
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proceedings or court decisions that is rendered public and becomes common 
knowledge, then the information can be cited from the decisions or court files for other 
purposes, even as possible evidence.208 This is in line with section 75 of the ITA. The 
authorised persons may however not provide, on request, additional information 
received.209 Contracting parties must state expressly in the treaty if one or both of them 
demand that the information may not be made public by courts and consequently be 
used for other purposes, as it is not the usual procedure under the party’s national 
law.210 This was however not stated in the China – South Africa Income Tax Treaty 
(2000) and the author recommends that the treaty be amended to include this statement.  
Article 26(4) of the OECD Model (2017) states that: 
“If information is requested by a Contracting State in accordance with this Article, 
the other Contracting State shall use its information gathering measures to obtain 
the requested information, even though that other State may not need such 
information for its own tax purposes. The obligation contained in the preceding 
sentence is subject to the limitations of paragraph 3 but in no case shall such 
limitations be construed to permit a Contracting State to decline to supply 
information solely because it has no domestic interest in such information.”211 
The China – South Africa tax treaty (2000) does not have a paragraph identical to 
this preceding article, but there is no difference in the interpretation of the treaty 
whether or not this paragraph is included or not.212 Nonetheless, no domestic tax 
interest restrictions exist in South Africa’s laws and therefore no information requests 
have been declined on the basis that South Africa must have a domestic tax interest in 
the information in order to obtain it.213  
Article 26(5) of the OECD Model (2017) states that: 
“In no case shall the provisions of paragraph 3 be construed to permit a Contracting 
State to decline to supply information solely because the information is held by a 
bank, other financial institution, nominee or person acting in an agency or a 
fiduciary capacity or because it relates to ownership interests in a person.”214 
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The China – South Africa tax treaty (2000) does not have a paragraph identical to 
the preceding paragraph. Without this rule, there are no obligations on a contracting 
state to supply banking information to the other contracting state. Nonetheless, South 
Africa permits exchange of banking information in the absence of this paragraph.215 
4.3.a.i Methods of exchange of taxpayer information 
Under the treaty, information can be exchanged upon request, automatically or 
spontaneously, or these forms can be combined.216 The exchanging states may 
further use other mechanisms where the information may be important to both 
contracting states, for example a tax examination abroad, a simultaneous 
examination or an industry-wide exchange of taxpayer information.217 This 
paper will however not focus on these additional forms. 
Exchange of taxpayer information upon request is where one state’s 
competent authority requests information from another state’s competent 
authority, concerning a certain case. The requested competent authority will 
then secure and transmit the requested information to the requesting competent 
authority, unless the requested state finds a ground upon which to refuse the 
information exchange.218 The competent authority of the requested state 
therefore has the responsibility to determine whether the requested information 
is appropriate under the treaty.219 
Contracting states may draft article 26 of a tax treaty to label certain 
information to be shared automatically, without a request or a link to a specific 
tax matter, with the other contracting state.  The China – South Africa Income 
Tax Treaty (2000) does not have an automatic exchange of taxpayer 
information provision in place.220 
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Contracting states may spontaneously exchange information when they 
discover information that may be useful and relevant to the other contracting 
state. The China – South Africa Income Tax Treaty (2000) does not explicitly 
provide for spontaneous exchange of taxpayer information.  
4.3.b The Joint Council of Europe / OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters as amended by the 2010 Protocol 
(Multilateral Convention) 
Both China and South Africa have signed and ratified the Multilateral Convention 
and included the China- South Africa Income Tax Treaty (2000) in their list of covered 
tax agreements under article 2(1)(a)(ii). According to article 1(3) of the Multilateral 
Convention, the Multilateral Convention aims to secure assistance in information 
exchange for both residents and non-residents. The taxes applicable to information 
exchanged under the Multilateral Convention are very broad and include taxes imposed 
at both the national and local levels, but both China and South Africa made reservations 
under article 30(1)(a) of the Multilateral Convention against providing assistance 
concerning certain kind of taxes.221 China further limits the geographical reach of the 
Multilateral Convention to not apply to Hong Kong or Macau.222 The Multilateral 
Convention will however apply to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and 
the Macao Special Administrative Region of China from 1 September 2018, subject to 
certain reservations.223 Under articles four to ten of the Multilateral Convention, 
foreseeably relevant information can be exchanged on request, automatically, 
spontaneously or under simultaneous examinations and tax examination aboard.224  
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Further, the Model Competent Authority Agreement for automatic information 
exchange is also executed under article 6 of the Multilateral Convention.225 Both South 
Africa and China signed the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on 
Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information. South Africa’s anticipated first 
information exchange date was September 2017 and China’s date was September 
2018.226 The Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in 
Tax Matters contains the Common Reporting Standard, namely due diligence rules that 
financial institutions must follow when reporting information. South Africa has made 
the necessary domestic law amendments in order to implement the OECD’s plan for 
automatic information exchange. Section 26 of the TAA was amended to require that 
South African financial institutions must collect certain information, with an associated 
obligation on the financial institutions to register with the SARS. This amendment was 
necessary to allow for the SARS to implement agreements under international tax 
standards, as the OECD Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account 
Information in Tax Matters. South Africa’s domestic law stipulates that financial 
institutions must report on all foreign account holders and all foreign controlling 
persons of entity account holders, irrespective of whether there is a treaty in place 
between South Africa and their residence jurisdiction or whether that country is a 
Common Reporting Standard partaking member.227  
The Multilateral Convention differs from the China – South Africa Income Tax 
Treaty (2000) in that article 22(4) of the Multilateral Convention allows contracting 
states to use the information that they received from the other state, for non-tax 
purposes. The prerequisite is that the information may be used for such other purposes 
under the laws of the supplying state (for example in cases of a treaty concerning 
judicial assistance or a non-fiscal crime) and that their competent authority authorises 
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such use.228 If it is not for this article, contracting states must exchange the information 
under a mechanism specifically intended for such other purposes, for example a treaty 
concerning mutual assistance in judicial matters.229 Article 22(4) therefore provides for 
information sharing with judicial and law enforcement authorities in important cases, 
for example to fight money laundering, terrorism financing or corruption.230 The 
receiving state must specify the non-taxation purpose for which it wants to use the 
information in their request to the supplying state.231 The supplying state is expected to 
authorise a non-tax use where it has concluded an international agreement or made 
other arrangements with the requesting state on mutual assistance between judicial 
authorities and other law enforcement agencies.232 The China – South Africa Mutual 
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Treaty (2004) is an example of such a treaty and 
South Africa will therefore be expected to authorise such non-tax use when China 
requests it, subject thereto that it meets the secrecy requirements set out in article 22 of 
the Multilateral Convention. The law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities of 
the receiving state must further treat the information as confidential.  
Article 22(4) of the Multilateral Convention facilitates the multilateral sharing of 
information with third parties, if the competent authority of the requested state 
authorises such use.233 
4.3.b.i Information sharing with governmental agencies under South African domestic 
law 
Article 22(4) of the Multilateral Convention states that China may use 
exchanged information for non-tax purposes, if the information may be used for 
such purposes under South Africa’s laws and South Africa authorises such use. 
This paragraph therefore considers whether South Africa’s laws allow 
exchanged information to be used for non-tax purposes. 
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The SARS may share information with agencies investigating tax offences. 
The South African Police Service (SAPS) can acquire information relating to a 
non-tax investigation from the SARS under an ex parte court application or 
where a particular request is made under specific legislation relating to the 
investigation and prevention of serious organised crime. The SARS is further 
obliged to report information relating to possible terrorist financing or money 
laundering to the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) under section 36(1) of FIC 
Act,234 which is not limited by the SARS’s statutory duty of confidentiality. For 
the purpose of ongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions, the SARS is 
allowed to share information with financial regulatory agencies such as FIC, the 
National Credit Regulator, the South African Reserve Bank and the Financial 
Services Board.235 In the event that alleged criminal offences include both non-
tax and tax offences, the SARS will co-operate with other law enforcement 
agencies, but the SARS will run its own parallel investigation and share 
information with the joint investigation team.236 
The first provision of the Multilateral Convention, i.e. that China may use 
information from South Africa for non-tax purposes, provided that the 
information may be used for such other purposes under South African law and 
the SARS authorises such use, is met as the SARS may share information with 
SAPS for use in a non-tax investigation, under an ex-parte court application.237  
4.4 POSITION WITH MORE THAN ONE EXCHANGE OF TAXPAYER INFORMATION 
INSTRUMENT IN PLACE  
China and South Africa have several agreements with exchange of taxpayer information 
mechanisms in place between them, including a bilateral treaty and both countries are 
signatories to the Multilateral Convention. Pertaining to the use of exchanged information for 
other purposes, the Multilateral Convention and the China – South Africa Income Tax Treaty 
(2000) have conflicting treaty norms. The Multilateral Convention allows the exchanged 
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information to be used for non-taxation purposes, but the bilateral treaty does not. The only 
way in which exchanged information may be used for non-tax purposes under the bilateral 
treaty is when it is made public in court proceedings. The question therefore arises as to which 
agreement governs.  
Where there are two or more exchange of taxpayer information instruments in place 
between South Africa and another state, the parties may choose the most appropriate 
instrument under which to exchange information.238 Article 27 of the Multilateral Convention, 
as well as the commentary to the OECD Model (2017),239 state that the assistance granted 
under it does not limit, nor is it limited by, other exchange of information agreements between 
the countries.240 The commentary of the OECD Model (2017) states that the provisions of more 
specialised instruments shall generally prevail over the bilateral tax treaty and uses the example 
of the exchange of information for custom duties, which has a legal basis in other 
instruments.241 The commentary to the Multilateral Convention further states that countries 
may use the most effective and least restrictive available instrument. The less restrictive 
provisions in instruments will prevail. In practice, when a country is a party to the Multilateral 
Convention and a bilateral tax treaty, the competent authority of the requesting state will 
request assistance under the instrument that will be the most effective.242 Contracting states 
may therefore choose to apply the most appropriate instrument for a specific case, but they 
may not concurrently implement more than one mechanism.243 The reference to ‘other 
international agreements’ in article 27 of the Multilateral Convention is very wide and includes 
bilateral agreements. The most appropriate instrument for circumstances where a requesting 
state wants to use exchanged information for non-tax purposes is the Multilateral Convention. 
Article 22(4) of the Multilateral Convention will prevail over article 26 of the China - South 
Africa Income Tax Treaty (2000) as it is the most effective and least restrictive instrument, as 
it provides for the use of the information for non-tax purposes. However, as stated in 4.2 above, 
the legal status of the OECD materials for non-OECD members is problematic. A further legal 
doctrine of international law that may help address the overlap is the doctrine of lex specialis, 
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namely that special legislation overrides general legislation. Where two or more norms deal 
with the same subject matter, priority should be given to the norm that is more specific. Under 
this doctrine, the Multilateral Convention, which specifically deals with assistance in tax 
matters in detail, will prevail over the bilateral treaty. Further, South Africa and China is bound 
to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Article 30 deals with the application 
of successive treaties relating to the same subject matter and article 30(3) of the VCLT states 
that: 
“When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier 
treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under article 59, the earlier treaty applies 
only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty.”244 
Both China and South Africa are parties to the earlier bilateral treaty and the later 
Multilateral Convention, and the bilateral treaty is not compatible with the Multilateral 
Convention concerning the use of information for other purposes. The author therefore 
concludes that the lex specialis doctrine and article 30(3) of the VCLT support the view that 
the provisions of the Multilateral Convention will override article 26 of the bilateral tax treaty, 
with regards to the use of exchanged information for non-tax purposes.   
The OECD published the Recommendation of the Council on Tax Measures for Further 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions in 2009. 
One of the recommendations is that member countries and parties to the OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention) must consider including in their respective tax treaties wording that 
allows tax authorities to share tax information with judicial authorities and other law 
enforcement agencies on certain important cases.245 Neither China, nor South Africa are OECD 
member countries, but South Africa ratified the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention on 19 June 
2007.  
The OECD’s first forum on tax and crime, namely the Oslo Dialogue, encourages 
government agencies to work together both domestically and internationally to fight economic 
                                                          
244 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, art 30(3). 
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crimes.246 This forum is supported by the G20247, therefore China and South Africa also 
support the forum. The G20 also supports international cooperation to prevent, investigate and 
prosecute corruption and to return stolen assets. The G20 further promotes co-operation 
between law enforcement and other relevant authorities within and between countries.248  
Both the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the G20 support co-operation between 
governmental agencies in order to combat economic crimes. South Africa and China’s support 
hereto therefore further illustrates their approval of article 22(4) of the Multilateral Convention. 
South Africa and China’s demonstrated their ‘approval’ when they ratified the Multilateral 
Convention under the Constitution in South Africa and under China’s Constitution and the 
Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Procedure of the Conclusion of Treaties.249 
4.5 SOUTH AFRICA’S EXCHANGE OF TAXPAYER INFORMATION PERFORMANCE 
The Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes Peer 
Reviews: South Africa 2013, states that South Africa is able to respond to information requests 
quickly and with high quality.250 In the period accessed, South Africa exchanged information 
within 90 days in 80% of the cases, within 180 days for 10% more cases and sent updates 
where information was delayed. South Africa’s peers consider South Africa a cooperative and 
reliable partner. 251 South Africa’s overall rating is ‘compliant’ for its legal and regulatory 
framework and the effectiveness of its exchange of taxpayer information in practice.252 
The Enforcement Risk Planning Division of the SARS is responsible for the daily 
administration of exchange of taxpayer information requests. This division has direct access to 
a database containing general information on taxpayers and their income as received by filed 
tax returns, as well as various external databases, for example the property register and the 
Companies and Intellectual Properties Commission’s register. The SARS has the power to 
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request information, search businesses, make formal inquiries and seize documents from 
anyone within their jurisdiction. If a person fails to provide the requested information, that 
person will receive a penalty.253 These access powers can be used even though South Africa 
does not have a domestic interest in the information, because South Africa’s information 
exchange agreements are implemented in South Africa’s domestic law.254 SAPS and the public 
prosecutor have discretions to provide information spontaneously to the SARS. Further, South 
Africa has no secrecy provisions that can obstruct access to information and no safeguards and 
rights, for example appeal or notification rights, which may stop or postpone effective 
information exchange.255 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
The arguments in 4.4 above support the view that article 22(4) of the Multilateral Convention 
will prevail over article 26 of the China - South Africa Income Tax Treaty (2000). Under the 
Multilateral Convention, information received from the other contracting state, may be used 
for other, non-tax purposes, provided that certain prerequisites are met. Where China receives 
information from South Africa under the Multilateral Convention, China may use it in a 
criminal case that may lead to a South African taxpayer being sentenced to death. The SARS 
has the responsibility to determine whether the requested information is appropriate under the 
treaty before authorisation of the use of the information for non-tax purposes under article 
22(4) of the Multilateral Convention. Whether it is information exchanged on request, 
spontaneously or automatically, the SARS has a legal duty to determine whether exchanging 
the information will be against South Africa’s public policy or not. This is particularly 
important in light thereof that South Africa is a reliable exchange of taxpayer information 
partner and that the SARS has access to several databases and has investigative powers. The 
SARS must therefore ensure that they use their powers correctly by determining whether the 
exchange of taxpayer information may be against South Africa’s public policy. 
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CHAPTER 5: THREE CASE STUDIES 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyses possible scenarios of exchange of South African taxpayers’ (as defined 
in 1.5) information with China. It provides detailed application of the theory discussed in the 
preceding content chapters to possible scenarios. 
5.2 APPLICATION TO PROBABLE SCENARIOS 
5.2.a The fraudulent South African lawyer 
5.2.a.i Facts 
A South African lawyer renders professional services in both South Africa and 
China. She is a citizen of South Africa and a tax resident in South Africa, as 
well as a taxpayer in China. She embezzled 90 Million RMB of her Chinese 
clients’, who are state owned companies, trust account money for her personal 
benefit in bank accounts in South Africa. She has not been tried or received 
criminal punishment in South Africa for this crime. The Chinese state conducts 
a tax investigation into the affairs of the lawyer and based on the investigation 
the Chinese tax authorities believe that she holds several undeclared bank 
accounts with South African banks.256 China therefore requests, under article 
5(1) of the Multilateral Convention, information from South Africa on all her 
accounts with South African banks. 
5.2.a.ii Application of China’s Criminal Law 
Article 383(3) of China’s Criminal Law states that if an individual embezzles 
an especially huge amount, which causes especially serious loss to the interests 
of the State and the people, that person shall be sentenced to life imprisonment 
or death and concurrently sentenced to confiscation of property.  
Article 8 of China’s Criminal Law, as outlined in 3.3.b.i above, applies, as 
the lawyer is a Chinese foreigner who commits a crime in South Africa against 
Chinese citizens and the state of China, as the clients are state owned 
                                                          
256 OECD Model Commentary op cit note 42 para 5. para 8(e). 
64 
 
 
 
companies. Further, article 8 requires that China’s Criminal Law must prescribe 
a minimum punishment of a fixed-term imprisonment of three years and the 
crime must be punishable according to the laws of the place where it is 
committed. China’s Criminal Law prescribes a minimum punishment of life 
imprisonment or death penalty and the crime of embezzlement is punishable 
according to South African law. China’s Criminal Law will therefore apply in 
this scenario.  
5.2.a.iii Remedy afforded to a taxpayer 
Under article 22(4) of the Multilateral Convention, as outlined in 4.3.b above, 
the information received by China may be used for non-tax criminal matters, as 
it may also be used for such purposes under South African domestic law. As 
described in 4.6 above, if the SARS authorises the use of the information for 
other purposes, China may use the received information in a criminal case 
against the lawyer, that may lead to her being sentenced to death. 
Under article 21(2)(d) of the Multilateral Convention, as outlined in 2.2 
above, South Africa is not obliged to carry out measures that would be contrary 
to South Africa’s public policy. Before exchanging the information and 
authorising its use for non-tax purposes, the SARS must take reasonable steps 
to evaluate whether it is foreseeable that the exchange of taxpayer information 
will be against South Africa’s public policy. As stated by Dourado in 2.2 above, 
the SARS must do a fundamental evaluation of the purpose for which the 
information is requested or how the information is going to be handled by China 
and whether it is compatible with South Africa's constitutional right to life and 
its international obligations. The SARS will know if China wants to use 
information for non-tax purposes as it is a prerequisite of article 22(4) of the 
Multilateral Convention that the SARS must authorise this use. As stated in 
4.3.b, China must specify to the SARS the non-tax purpose for which they want 
to use the information. The author recommends that the SARS must consult 
with a Chinese legal expert and the Chinese tax authorities to establish whether 
the information could, foreseeably, result in the death penalty and what the 
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execution method might be. As stated in 4.3.a, the SARS may disclose the 
information to the taxpayer. Further, based on Kaunda v the Republic of South 
Africa in 2.4 above, the author recommends that the SARS must warn the 
taxpayer that the SARS will send the information to China, even though the 
SARS does not have a duty to warn the taxpayer. It is currently not the SARS’ 
practice to notify the relevant taxpayer upon receiving an information exchange 
request from another state and taxpayers are not afforded the opportunity to 
make any representations during the exchange process, nor are they informed 
of the exchange after the fact.257 A taxpayer does not have a right to be notified 
of an exchange of information request, nor does the taxpayer have a right to 
appeal or object to the request. The author however recommends that it is best 
practice for the SARS to give the taxpayer concerned notice of the impending 
exchange, with an opportunity to make representations, to check the accuracy 
of the information and to alert the taxpayer to the potential non-tax use and 
sanctions. A taxpayer’s right to be informed of a taxpayer information exchange 
and to challenge the accuracy of the information ought to be afforded to the 
taxpayer under South Africa’s domestic tax laws.258  
South Africa’s public policy does not support the death penalty, as 
established in 2.5 above. The SARS will therefore not be obliged to exchange 
information where it is foreseeable that it may lead to imposition of the death 
penalty on the lawyer in China. Further, as stated in 2.5, an information 
exchange under these circumstances will be contrary to the lawyer’s 
constitutional right to life in South Africa and, in the event that the method of 
execution in China is cruel, inhuman or degrading, it will be against South 
Africa’s international obligations. The lawyer is within the jurisdiction of the 
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Constitution as she is a natural person in South Africa. The SARS therefore has 
a duty not to exchange the information. 
5.2.b The smuggling Chinese flight attendant  
5.2.b.i Facts  
A flight attendant of Cathay Pacific regularly works on flights between Beijing, 
China and Johannesburg, South Africa. The flight attendant is a taxpayer in 
South Africa, as he owns an apartment in South Africa from which he earns 
rental income. He is a citizen and tax resident of China. He illegally transported 
explosive substances on the flights from China and illegally traded the 
explosives in Johannesburg. Upon arrival at OR Tambo International Airport, 
the flight attendant was caught in possession of explosives when he passed 
through customs control and was held at the airport. Further, the SARS had 
information on the flight attendant’s income from illegal trading that they 
wanted to spontaneously exchange with China. Under article 7(1)(a) of the 
Multilateral Convention, South Africa shall, without prior request, forward to 
China information of which it has knowledge where South Africa has grounds 
for supposing that there may be a loss of tax in China.  
5.2.b.ii Application of China’s Criminal Law 
Article 125 of China’s Criminal Law states that whoever illegally transports or 
trades in explosives and where the circumstances are serious, shall be sentenced 
to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 10 years, life imprisonment or 
death.  
According to article 6 of China’s Criminal Law, as outlined in 3.3.b.i above, 
this law shall be applicable as the flight attended committed a crime on board 
an aircraft of China by transporting explosives on the aircraft. Further, 
according to article 7 of China’s Criminal Law, also outlined in 3.3.b.i, this law 
is applicable as the flight attendant is a citizen of China who committed the 
crime of trading in explosives in South Africa.  
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5.2.b.iii Remedy afforded to a taxpayer 
Under article 22(4) of the Multilateral Convention, and as outlined in 4.3.b 
above, the information received by China, may also be used in non-tax criminal 
matters, if the SARS authorises this use. South Africa’s information can 
therefore possibly result in the flight attendant being sentenced to death in 
China. Before exchanging the information and authorising its use for non-tax 
purposes, the SARS must take reasonable steps to evaluate whether it is 
foreseeable that the exchange of taxpayer information will lead to the 
imposition of the death penalty on the flight attendant in China. The content of 
the SARS’s duty is explained in 5.2.a.iii.   
People held at airports in South Africa, pending a decision on whether they 
may formally enter South Africa, are within the jurisdiction of South Africa for 
the enforcement of the Bill of Rights, as established in 2.4. The flight attendant 
therefore carries the protection of the right to life under section 11 of the 
Constitution. If the SARS exchanges information of the flight attendant with 
China, where it is foreseeable that it will lead to him being sentenced to death 
in China, it constitutes a violation of his right to life. Further, as outlined in 2.5, 
the information exchange will also breach South Africa’s international 
obligations if the method of execution in China is cruel, inhuman or degrading. 
South Africa’s public policy is against the death penalty. Under article 
21(2)(d) of the Multilateral Convention, and as outlined in 2.2 above, the SARS 
has a duty not to exchange information or approve its use for non-tax purposes, 
where it is foreseeable that it may lead to the imposition of the death penalty in 
China.  
5.2.c The corrupt Chinese executive 
5.2.c.i Facts  
A senior executive of a Chinese public enterprise accepted large bribes in China 
from a multinational company to obtain business worldwide. The executive is 
in China and the proceeds from the illicit transactions are kept in South Africa. 
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The executive is a tax resident of Singapore, a citizen and taxpayer in China 
and a taxpayer in South Africa. Under article 6 of the Multilateral Convention, 
the SARS wants to automatically exchange the information regarding the 
proceeds from the bribery with China, as it is foreseeable that it is relevant for 
the enforcement of China’s domestic laws, concerning the taxes covered by the 
Multilateral Convention.  
5.2.c.ii Application of China’s Criminal Law 
Article 386 of China’s Criminal Law, as stated in 3.3.b above, establishes that 
the executive shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or receive the death 
penalty and concurrently be sentenced to confiscation of property, for accepting 
the bribes.  
According to article 6 of China’s Criminal Law, as stated in 3.3.b.i above, 
this law is applicable as the executive committed a crime within China’s 
territory.  
5.2.c.iii Remedy afforded to a taxpayer 
As outlined in 4.3.b above, if the SARS authorises the use of the information 
for other purposes under article 22(4) of the Multilateral Convention, China 
may use the received information in a criminal case against the executive that 
may lead to him being sentenced to death.   
Under article 21(2)(d) of the Multilateral Convention, as outlined in 2.2 
above, the SARS is not obliged to exchange the information or authorise its use 
for non-taxation purposes, as it is foreseeable that it may lead to imposition of 
the death penalty on the executive in China, which is against South Africa’s 
public policy. The SARS must take reasonable steps to evaluate whether the 
information could, foreseeably, result in the death penalty of the executive and 
what the execution method might be. The SARS’s duty is further explained in 
5.2.a.iii above. 
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As stated in 2.5, an information exchange that may lead to the imposition 
of the death penalty will be contrary to South Africa’s international obligations 
if the method of execution in China is cruel, inhuman or degrading.  
Everyone, namely every person within the jurisdiction of the South African 
courts, has the right to life. The executive is not physically present in South 
Africa and constitutional protection is therefore not triggered, as established in 
2.4 above. This however does not affect the public policy-based remedy 
provided under the Multilateral Convention. According to article 21(2)(d) of 
the Multilateral Convention, the SARS does not have an obligation to exchange 
information where the disclosure will be contrary to public policy. Therefore, 
even where the SARS does not have a constitutional obligation not to exchange 
the information, it is not obliged to do so as the death penalty is contrary to 
South Africa’s public policy, as established in 2.3.  
5.3 CONCLUSION 
The possible scenarios of exchange of South African taxpayers’ information with China 
illustrate that information exchanged under the Multilateral Convention may lead to the 
imposition of the death penalty on a South African taxpayer in China under China’s Criminal 
Law. The SARS must take reasonable steps to evaluate whether the information could, 
foreseeably, result in the death penalty of a South African taxpayer in China. The SARS must 
not exchange the information or authorise its use for non-tax criminal matters where it is 
foreseeable that it may lead to a taxpayer being sentenced to death, because it is against South 
Africa’s public policy, a taxpayer’s right to life (where the taxpayer is within South Africa’s 
jurisdiction) and South Africa’s international obligations (where the imposition of the death 
penalty in China is cruel, inhuman or degrading). 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter revisits the research question in light of the content chapters and thereafter, 
summary remarks and a conclusion are provided. The chapter then reviews the possibility of 
amending the wording of the treaties in order to clarify and reinforce the protection afforded 
to a South African taxpayer.  
6.2 CONCLUSION 
In summary, South Africa can exchange a South African taxpayer’s information with China 
under the China – South Africa Income Tax Treaty (2000) or the Multilateral Convention. 
Pertaining to the use of this information in China for non-tax purposes, article 22(4) of the 
Multilateral Convention and article 26 of the China – South Africa Income Tax Treaty (2000) 
are conflicting treaty norms and article 22(4) of the Multilateral Convention will prevail. China 
may therefore use information received from South Africa, under the Multilateral Convention, 
for criminal prosecution of a South African taxpayer in non-tax matters in China, provided that 
the SARS authorises the use.  
This paper established that China imposes the death penalty for economic crimes and the 
territorial scope of China’s criminal law is unlimited. Available cases establish that China 
imposes the death penalty for embezzlement and bribery and it is therefore not only a 
theoretical matter. Where China therefore receives information from South Africa under the 
Multilateral Convention with authorisation that China may use the information for non-tax 
purposes, China may use it in a criminal case that may lead to a South African taxpayer being 
sentenced to death. 
This paper further established that the SARS has discretion to use the public-policy based 
remedy in the tax treaties with China and refuse to exchange information as the death penalty 
is contrary to South Africa’s public policy. The public policy-based remedy can also be 
enforced under the revenue rule. Where the South African taxpayer concerned is in South 
Africa, including at a sea- or airport, then the SARS has a constitutional obligation not to 
exchange the information. Further, the South African state has an international obligation not 
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to exchange the information where the method of execution in China is cruel, inhuman or 
degrading.  
6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDING SOUTH AFRICA’S TAX TREATIES  
A further option, to reinforce the public policy-based remedies provided to a South African 
taxpayer under the China – South Africa Income Tax Treaty (2000) and the Multilateral 
Convention, is to amend the wording of these treaties to reinforce that South Africa’s public 
policy prevents the imposition and enforcement of the death penalty.  
Just like South Africa, Germany will not exchange information where it is in conflict with 
Germany’s public policy. Germany reportedly envisioned making a reservation to the 
Multilateral Convention and an observation to the commentary to the Multilateral Convention 
in the 2014 update to state that Germany’s public policy specifically prevents the imposition 
of the death penalty. The reservation and observation were however not included, presumably 
because it would have only clarified the meaning of public policy and all the states must have 
made the observation and reservation for it to be practical.259 Germany’s tax treaties usually 
state that exchanged information may be used in all tax proceedings, including criminal 
proceedings related to tax offences, but the Protocol to the China – Germany Income and 
Capital Tax Treaty (2014)260 states that exchanged information may only be used in criminal 
matters with the prior consent of the supplying state. This reservation ensures that information 
cannot be used where it may lead to the imposition of the death penalty on a taxpayer.261 
 Further, article 26(3)(c) of the Germany - Tunisia Income and Capital Tax Treaty 
(unofficial translation) (2018), which is not yet in force, states that: 
“In the case of the Federal Republic of Germany, public policy (ordre public) includes in 
particular the prevention of the imposition and enforcement of death penalty. Where 
information is disclosed in a public trial or in a court decision, the Contracting States shall 
ensure that such information is not used for a procedure in which the death penalty is likely 
to be imposed and enforced.” 262 
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Further, the Italy – Panama Competent Authority Agreement on Automatic Exchange of 
Information (2017), which is not yet in force, states that: 
“Information exchanged may not be used or disclosed in proceedings that could result in 
the imposition and execution of the death penalty or torture or other severe violations of 
human rights (including tax investigations motivated by political, racial, or religious 
prosecution).”263 
Amendments to the China – South Africa Income Tax Treaty (2000) and the Multilateral 
Convention in accordance with the wording of the examples above, will only clarify the 
meaning of South Africa’s public policy. Further, the Multilateral Convention already affords 
the protection that the SARS must authorise the use of exchanged information in criminal 
matters in China. The author however recommends amendments of the treaties in accordance 
with the above examples as the wording reinforces what South Africa’s public policy towards 
the death penalty is and therefore strengthens taxpayers’ protection to prevent their information 
from being used in proceedings that may lead to the imposition of the death penalty. The 
current wording of the public policy-based remedy in the treaties are too technical and requires 
much reading in, based on OECD guidance. The amendments must give express recognition 
to limits imposed by the Constitution, namely the duty on SARS to take active steps to protect 
the right to life. Specific recommendations pertaining to the wording of the amendments are 
provided below. 
6.4 FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
The paper therefore found that a South African taxpayer has public policy-based remedies, 
but the following recommendations are proposed on how to reinforce the protection available 
to South African taxpayers: 
 The SARS must protect a South African taxpayer’s fundamental right to life by doing an 
evaluation, prior to the information exchange, of the purpose for which the information is 
requested or how the information is going to be handled by China and whether it is 
compatible with South Africa's public policy. Where the SARS foresees that there is a 
sufficient real risk that the SARS’s action will lead to a taxpayer being sentenced to death 
                                                          
263 Agreement between the Competent Authorities of the Italian Republic and the Republic of Panama on the Automatic 
Exchange of Financial Account Information to Improve International Tax Compliance s 5(2) (21 June 2017), Treaties 
IBFD.  
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in China, the SARS has a legal duty not to exchange the information with China. The SARS 
must further notify the taxpayer concerned of the impeding information exchange. This 
process must be followed in exchange of taxpayer information on request, automatic 
exchange of taxpayer information and spontaneous exchange of taxpayer information. 
 South Africa must make a reservation to the Multilateral Convention and an observation to 
the commentary to the Multilateral Convention to state that South Africa’s public policy 
specifically prevents the imposition and the enforcement of the death penalty.  
 South Africa should seek an amendment of Article 26(1) of the China – South Africa 
Income Tax Treaty (2000) to state that information may not be made public by courts and 
consequently be used for a procedure in which the death penalty is likely to be imposed or 
enforced. In the alternative, that exchanged information may only be used in criminal 
matters with the prior consent of the supplying state. 
 In the event that China does not agree to such amendments, another remedy must be found 
to ensure that the SARS does not inadvertently exchange information. An option is a 
memorandum of understanding with China, but this would only bind China’s tax authority 
and not the rest of the government. A better option would be to use a unilateral instrument 
that binds the SARS, namely to obtain a binding general ruling under section 89 of the 
TAA. This ruling will clarify the SARS’ interpretation of protecting a taxpayer’s right to 
life in the exchange of taxpayer information process. 
South Africa must be an example of practical protection of human rights to other 
developing and emerging countries. This paper concludes that legislation/treaties must be 
amended and the SARS’s conduct in practice must be reformed to ensure that the constitutional 
right to life of a South African taxpayer remains protected amidst increased taxpayer 
information transparency. 
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